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The Judicial Role in Intergovernmental
Land Use Disputes: The Case Against
Balancing
Laurie Reynolds*
INTRODUCTION
In the exercise of its properly delegated powers, a state or

local governmental unit frequently operates within the territorial jurisdiction of another governmental unit.' A city, for example, may choose a site in a rural portion of the county in
which it is located as the place to operate a landfill. 2 A school
district may want to locate a facility within an area not zoned
by the city for school uses.3 Or a state agency may seek to es*

Assistant Professor
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Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign.
1. In this Article the term "intergovernmental" refers only to intrastate
intergovernmental conflicts. This Article does not consider the conflicts that
arise when the federal government seeks to establish a use in contravention of
local ordinances. For cases adopting the majority view that the federal government is immune from local regulations, see Township of Middletown v. N/E
Regional Office, United States Postal Serv., 601 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.N.J. 1985);
Thanet Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 108 N.J. Super. 65, 66-67, 260 A.2d 1, 2
(App. Div. 1969); Lane County v. Bessett, 46 Or. App. 319, 328-29, 612 P.2d 297,
302 (1980); Town of Coventry v. Glickman, 429 A.2d 440, 442 (R.I. 1981). The
Article also does not consider whether a governmental unit should be subject
to its own land use regulations. For cases holding that a governmental unit is
bound by its own regulations, see Clark v. Town of Estes Park, 686 P.2d 777,
779 (Colo. 1984); Rich v. City of Englewood, 657 P.2d 961, 962-63 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); Parkway Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 295 So. 2d 295, 295-96 (Fla. 1974); Hunke v. Foote, 84 Idaho 391, 395,
373 P.2d 322, 323 (1962). For cases in which courts have exempted governmental units from their own ordinances, see Keiswetter v. City of Petoskey, 124
Mich. App. 590, 594-95, 335 N.W.2d 94, 96 (1983); Witzel v. Village of Brainard,
208 Neb. 231, 302 N.W.2d 723 (1981); McGrath v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H.
355, 357, 307 A.2d 830, 832 (1973); Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624,
256 A.2d 457 (1969). See generally Wright, Intergovernmental Relations: An
Analytical Overview, in URBAN POLITICS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 275
(H. Hahn & C. Levine eds. 1980), for a discussion of various types of intergovernmental relationships.
2. See cases cited infra note 182.
3. E.g., Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 468 So. 2d 709
(La. Ct. App. 1985); Village of Camillus v. West Side Gymnastics School, Inc.,
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tablish a residential treatment center for juvenile delinquents
in an area of a city zoned only for single family residences. 4
The potential for dispute between the two units is at its maximum when the intruding governmental unit (the "intruder")
proposes a use perceived by the host government (the "host")5
as noxious, dangerous, or contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of its constituency. Frequently, the statutory delegation of
extraterritorial land use rights does not indicate which governmental unit involved in the dispute has the superior right. 6
These intergovernmental disputes raise several common
and valid concerns. Granting an intruder immunity from the
host's regulations may, for example, promote unilateral and irresponsible decision making by the intruder. In addition, an
immune intruder might be insensitive to the host's concerns
and unwilling to negotiate to minimize the negative effects of
the proposed use. In contrast, granting a host control over the
intruder's project may be unwise because of the host's narrower
self-interest and the inadequacy of its decision making process
to evaluate the broader or different public interest being served
by the intruder. These concerns indicate that in some instances
the intruder should be granted immunity, while in others the
host should be granted control over the project.
From the early cases involving local opposition to the construction of highway systems, 7 waterworks,8 and airports 9 in vi109 Misc. 2d 609, 440 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981); City of Sunset Valley v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 488 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
4. E.g., Township of Pemberton v. State, 178 N.J. Super. 346, 429 A.2d 360
(App. Div. 1981); Township of S. Fayette v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 574, 385

A.2d 344 (1978).
5. In this Article, the terms "intruder" and "host" designate, respectively, the governmental unit seeking to establish the disputed use inside another government's territorial borders, and the governmental unit asserting its
territorial sovereignty over the proposed use. These terms embody no judgment about the relative merits of either governmental unit's position.
6. For examples of cases discussing specific statutory provisions that provide for either host control or intruder immunity, see infra note 142.
7. E.g., Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 18 N.J. 237,
244-46, 113 A.2d 658, 662 (1955) (highway authority not subject to host town's
zoning ordinances in constructing restaurants and filling stations for proper
public use along a parkway project); State ex reL Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v.
Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 174-75, 107 N.E.2d 345, 350 (turnpike commission exempted from zoning ordinance where agency is vested with power of eminent
domain), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952).
8. E.g., Village of Larchmont v. Town of Mamaroneck, 239 N.Y. 551, 203
N.Y.S. 957, 957, 147 N.E. 191, 191 (1924) (host town enjoined from enforcing
zoning ordinance where plaintiff's waterworks building was held for public
use). But see Taber v. City of Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 525-26, 274 N.W.
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olation of local zoning ordinances, a variety of judicial rules
emerged that generally granted the intruder immunity from
host control. Intruder immunity resulted if the court determined that the intruder was exercising a governmental rather
than proprietary function,' 0 if the intruder possessed the power
of eminent domain over the disputed land,"1 or if the intruder
occupied the position of a superior sovereign in the court's view
of the hierarchy of state and local governmental units.'2
By the early 1970s, however, these three traditional tests
for governmental immunity had been vigorously criticized as
unreasoned, inflexible, and incapable of dealing with the complexities of modern land use disputes. 13 As a result, various
state courts abandoned their prior adherence to the traditional
immunity rules in favor of a more general and flexible balancing of interests test. Eschewing the mechanical application of
the immunity label, these courts stressed the need for a betterreasoned approach to the question of which governmental interest should prevail in the particular factual situation. Commentators and courts alike heralded the new balancing test as
more responsive to both governments' legitimate interests and
better able to deal with the complexities of our highly urban14
ized society.
324, 325 (1937) (municipality operating waterworks system in proprietary capacity must comply with zoning ordinances).
9. E.g., Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 283, 119
A.2d 761, 766 (1956) (where airport legislation bestowed power of eminent domain, intruder municipality's airport expansion was exempt from host township's zoning ordinances); State ex rel Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37
Ohio Op. 58, 61-62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 703-05 (C.P. Ct. 1947) (appropriating land for
public airport zoned by host for residential purposes within intruder's power
of eminent domain), af'd , 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 46-62.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 20-30.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
13. See, e.g., Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1971) [hereinafter Note, Governmental Immunity]; Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Construction and Land
Use by Other State Agencies, 49 MINN. L. REv. 284 (1964); Comment, The Inapplicability of Municipal Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Uses, 19
SYRACUSE L. REV. 698 (1968); Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to GovernmentalLand Use, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 316 (1961).
14. See Johnston, Recent Cases in the Law on Intergovernmental Zoning
Immunity: New StandardsDesigned to Maximize the Public Interests, 8 URB.
LAw. 327 (1976) (balancing test encourages good faith reconciliation of adverse
land use proposals, thereby discouraging litigation and maximizing use of expert opinion); Note, Governmental Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.L. REV. 783
(1981) [hereinafter Note, Immunity from Zoning] (preferred balancing test in
need of modification to include all factors relevant to maximizing public inter-
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Perhaps because of its intuitive appeal and reasonable results, ten state courts have adopted the balancing test 15 and several others intimated that they find the new approach
preferable to the more rigid rules of absolute immunity. 16 At
the same time, however, one state supreme court recently reest); Comment, Balancing Interests to Determine Governmental Exemption
from Zoning Laws, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 125 [hereinafter Comment, BalancingInterests] (arguing that balancing test provides courts with flexibility that produces decisions in the public interest). The balancing test was praised as a test
that allowed the intruder to proceed with its project, but not at the expense of
the host's land use plans. For example, a balancing court might authorize the
construction of a university dormitory in violation of local zoning, but only after the intruder displayed a sensitivity to local opposition and a willingness to
minimize the negative impact of its proposed use. See Rutgers, State Univ. v.
Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153-54, 286 A.2d 697, 703 (1972). Conversely, a balancing
court might refuse to exempt an intruder from local zoning laws if the court
determined that the enforcement of the host's regulations would not totally
frustrate the intruder's legitimate attempt to exercise its powers. See, e.g.,
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980). See
also cases cited infra note 15.
15. ' Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 1976), aff'g 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102,
112, 576 P.2d 230, 238 (1978); Dearden v. City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 264, 269
N.W.2d 139, 142 (1978); Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468,
471, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972); Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 15253, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1972); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d
694, 698 (N.D. 1977); Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d
1365, 1367 (1980); Independent School Dist. No. 89 v. City of Oklahoma City,
722 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Okla. 1986); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State
Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1240 (R.I. 1982); Lincoln County v.
Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977). Although the Kansas Forestry case
is cited by courts, the Kansas Supreme Court has not adopted the appellate
court's opinion in that case. In fact, it has specifically found the balancing test
inapplicable to determine whether local building codes should apply to the intruder's project. State ex rel. Schneider v. City of Kansas City, 228 Kan. 25, 38,
612 P.2d 578, 587 (1980). The court reserved judgment on whether the balancing test was appropriate for resolution of intergovernmental zoning disputes.
Id In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Dearden v. City of
Detroit is listed here as a balancing test because the court itself describes its
opinion as applying a test similar to the Piluso test. See 403 Mich. at 264 n.4,
269 N.W.2d at 142 n.4. The court did not, however, engage in a balancing of
interests; its approach is discussed infra note 105.
16. Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Haw. 582, 586, 545 P.2d 684, 687 (1976);
Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of Wilmette, 112 Ill. 2d 6, -, 490 N.E.2d 1282,
1286-87 (1986); City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 43 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); County of Knox v. City of Creighton, 214 Neb. 196, 198, 333
N.W.2d 395, 396 (1983). For dissenting opinions arguing against application of
the traditional rules, see City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Ct., 90 Ariz. 393, 399405, 368 P.2d 637, 640-45 (1962) (Lockwood, J., dissenting); City of New Orleans
v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020, 1023-24 (La. 1978) (Marcus, J., dissenting).
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versed its previous adoption of the balancing test1 7 and two
other courts have expressly declined to adopt it. 18 These courts
have criticized the balancing test as nebulous and unpredictable
and contend that it provides an incentive for litigation and
appeals.
This Article examines the judicial role in intergovernmental land disputes. Part I evaluates the three traditional tests for

governmental immunity and notes their advantages and disadvantages. Parts II and III then examine the more recent balancing test and analyze its strengths and weaknesses.
Drawing from the analyses in the first three Parts, Part IV
first sets forth the Article's two proposals for limiting judicial
involvement in intergovernmental disputes while at the same
time encouraging intergovernmental cooperation: that the intruding governmental unit should always participate in the host
government's procedures at both the administrative and legislative level; and that a rule allocating the land use right to one
governmental unit or the other is preferable to balancing. The
first proposal seeks to protect the governments' constituents
from the dangers inherent in both irresponsible and unilateral
decision making. This requirement reflects the belief that open
participation in local procedures encourages rational decision
making and minimizes the potential for litigation. In addition,
the factual record made during the local hearing provides the
needed evidentiary record for judicial review if a compromise
does not result. 19 The second proposal stimulates privately negotiated
settlements
and avoids
unnecessary
judicial
involvement.
This Article's suggested approach is similar to the traditional intruder immunity tests in that it prefers a clear and definite rule that offers the parties a predetermined allocation of
the land use right at issue. Part IV, therefore, also considers
17. Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n,
505 Pa. 614, 627, 483 A.2d 448, 454 (1984).
18. Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commi'n, 252 Ga. 484, 490, 314 S.E.2d 218, 223, appeal dismissed, 469
U.S. 802 (1984); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb.
266, 276, 242 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1976).
19. In Conners v. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children, 82 Misc. 2d
861, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1975), the court complained that the record contained no evidence about the rationale behind the intruder's choice of site or
the land use impact of its proposal. Id at 864-65, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78. The
unavailability of relevant evidence was due in part to the intruder's assertion
of absolute immunity and its failure to seek host approval. Id& at 862-63, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 476.
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the proper allocation of the land use right in the four contexts
in which intergovernmental disputes arise: when the intruding
government embraces 9a the host government; when the host
government embraces the intruding government; when the two
governmental units are coterminous; and when the two governmental units are noncontiguous. Viewed from the perspective
of these intergovernmental relationships, two major considerations become relevant to the choice between host control and
intruder immunity. First, the political relationship that exists
between the two units and the characteristics of their respective political processes will operate either to inhibit or stimulate each governmental unit's incentive to reach an acceptable
compromise. Second, the scope of each unit's governmental
powers and the constituents it represents is an important factor
that changes with the context of the conflict. Based on a consideration of these two factors, the land use right should be
granted to the unit with more incentive to respond to the other
unit's legitimate needs and concerns. Applying this analysis to
the four contexts described above, Part IV produces the following rules: if the intruder embraces the host or if the two units
are coterminous, immunity should be granted to the intruder; if
the host embraces the intruder or if the units are noncontiguous, however, the host should be granted the right of control.
Finally, the Article suggests that an arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review that requires courts to consider the legislative mandates of both governmental units will
best effectuate the resolution of the two conflicting legislative
goals involved in the land use dispute.
I.

AN EVALUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL
RULES OF IMMUNITY

A. THE EMINENT DOMAIN TEST
Under the eminent domain theory of governmental immunity, when the intruder possesses the power of eminent domain, the host's zoning powers cannot apply to the intruder's
proposed use.20 This theory is based on the concern that appli19a.
20.

For a discussion of the term "embraces," see infra note 164.
For examples of cases adopting the eminent domain test, see Mayor of

Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954); State ex reL Askew v.
Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960); City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589
S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App. 1979); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward,
196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976); State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v.
Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); State
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cation of the host's zoning ordinance in such cases could completely frustrate the intruder's attempts to exercise its
legitimate, delegated powers of eminent domain within the
host's territorial jurisdiction.2 1 Some of the courts adopting this
rule have concluded that the eminent domain power "is inherently superior to the exercise of the zoning power." 22 Other
courts have found that the grant of extraterritorial condemnation power itself evidences a legislative intent to immunize the
exercise of that power from host control. 2 3 In addition, a few
courts have reasoned that although zoning ordinances are based
on the premise that private property rights must yield to the
overriding general welfare served by zoning, this general rule
has no application in the context of governmental uses of land
because the intruder's use of public property for public purposes already presupposes the furtherance of the general
24
welfare.
Critics of the eminent domain test have argued that the
test improperly permits the intruding governmental body to
stymie the host's attempts to promote rational land use control
and development.2 5 In addition, the rule decreases the intruder's incentive to negotiate: if the intruding government is
assured of immunity, the critics claim, it may act irresponsibly
ex rel Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (C.P.
Ct. 1947), aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948); South Hill Sewer Dist.
v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 591 P.2d 877 (1979).
21. See State ex re. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Mo. 1960);
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980).
22. Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 274,
242 N.W.2d 849, 854 (1976); accordSouth Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22
Wash. App. 738, 742, 591 P.2d 877, 880 (1979). One explanation for this somewhat curious assertion was given by the court in City of Kirkwood v. City of
Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), when it noted that because
the eminent domain power has its source in the state constitution it cannot be
restricted by the zoning power, which does not have a constitutional origin.
Because state police power is deemed inherent and because state constitutions
are limits rather than grants of power, however, the relevance of the assertion
is dubious. See, e.g., Oakland County Taxpayers' League v. Board of Supervisors, 355 Mich. 305, 323, 94 N.W.2d 875, 885 (1959) (constitution a limit on the
exercise of legislative power). See also Village of Lucas v. Lucas Local School
Dist., 2 Ohio St. 3d 13, 15, 442 N.E.2d 449, 451 (1982) (even constitutionally
granted powers yield to statutorily granted powers if the legislative acts are of
broader concern than the constitutionally granted local powers).
23. E.g., Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 283, 119
A.2d 761, 766 (1956).
24. See, e.g., State ex rel Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op.
58, 62, 79 N.E.2d 698, 705 (C.P. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694
(1948).
25. See, e.g., Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note 13, at 875-76.
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and without concern for the landowners immediately affected

by the proposed use. 26 Concerned with this potential for abuse,

one critic described the immunity conferred by the eminent domain test as a "license for irresponsible governments to run
rough-shod over the interests of adjacent jurisdictions in the
name of general welfare." 27
Although this parade of horribles does seem to be a possible result of the application of the eminent domain test, little
evidence in the case law suggests that these dire predictions
have become a reality. Implicit in many of the decisions granting the intruder immunity under the eminent domain test has
been the requirement that the intruder act responsibly and
with sensitivity to the host's land use plan and local concerns.
Some of the courts applying the eminent domain test have specifically noted that the host should be afforded some protection
against the potential for arbitrary and capricious actions by the
intruder.28 In addition, the reported cases upholding intruder
immunity under the eminent domain test give no hint of irresponsible or arbitrary decision making on the part of the
29
intruder.
It is true, however, that a blanket grant of immunity, one
free from the requirement that the intruder respond in good
faith to host concerns, imposes no judicially created incentive
for negotiation and compromise. To the extent that nonjudicial
factors are ineffective in producing intergovernmental cooperation, courts should require negotiation between the parties.
Thus, the crucial flaw in the eminent domain test lies not so
much in the results that have been obtained, but rather in the
fact that it fails to protect against unilateral decision making by
the intruder. 30
26. Id.
27. Johnston, supra note 14, at 331-32.
28. E.g., Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 191, 84 S.E.2d 454, 45455 (1954); State ex reL. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 891 (Mo. 1960); State ex
rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 63-64, 79 N.E.2d 698,
706 (C.P. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948). The law of
nuisance also affords protection to the host and its constituents. See i&L at 6566, 79 N.E.2d at 705.
29. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 683 (1964).

30. Even in the absence of judicially or legislatively mandated intergovernmental cooperation, such cooperation is nevertheless extensive. See R.
BISH & V. OSTROM,UNDERSTANDING URBAN GOVERNMENT 68 (1973) and studies cited therein. In addition, as Bish and Ostrom note, rational individuals
will search out negotiated solutions if only because they are less expensive
than adjudicated solutions and, also, because these governmental units must
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THE SUPERIOR SOVEREIGN TEST

The second judicial rule for deciding between host control
and intruder immunity requires courts to rank the competing
governmental units within a hierarchy of state sovereignty.
This superior sovereign test grants immunity to the intruder if
31
the intruder is ranked the "higher" sovereign of the two.
Under this rule, immunity has been granted to state agencies

32
seeking exemptions from local regulation and to counties resisting the application of city or village zoning to county property. 33 If the intruder does not occupy a superior rank, the
determine
court will resort to rules of statutory construction to
34
whether host control is appropriate in a given case.
Commentators have uniformly denounced the application
of the superior sovereign test. The major defects cited include
35
the test's lack of safeguards against irresponsibility, the practical difficulties inherent in developing a system of sovereign

coexist on a daily basis. I&r at 67-68. See also Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 612 n.3 (Fla. 1976)
(public interest served by requiring that state agencies seek local approval of
proposed nonconforming use because zoning appeals are less expensive and
more expeditious alternative to litigation).
31. In Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d
761 (1956), the court described the rule: "[W]here the immunity from local
zoning regulation is claimed by any agency or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory language to the
contrary." I& at 282, 119 A.2d at 765. Although the New Jersey court expressly repudiated this rule in Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286
A.2d 697 (1972), vestiges of the superior sovereignty rationale survive. In the
Piluso decision itself, for example, the court noted that, in general, the state
and its agencies will be immune from local regulation. Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at
703. For a discussion of the Piluso decision, see infra text accompanying notes
68-74.
32. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 223, 378 A.2d 1326,
1329 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); County Comm'rs v. Conservation Comm'n, 380 Mass.
706, 708, 405 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1980); City of Portsmouth v. John T. Clark &
Son, 117 N.H. 797, 798, 378 A.2d 1383, 1384 (1977); City of Santa Fe v. Armijo,
96 N.M. 663, 664, 634 P.2d 685, 686 (1981); In re Suntide Inn Motel, Oklahoma
City, 563 P.2d 125, 127 (Okla. 1977); Morse v. Vermont Div. of State Bldgs., 136
Vt. 253, 255, 388 A.2d 371, 372 (1978).
33. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App.
2d 160, 164-65, 28 Cal. Rptr. 32, 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Appelbaum v. St. Louis
County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Mo. 1970). At least one court, however, has concluded that counties and cities enjoy equal rank. See City of Richmond v.
Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1958).
34. See, e.g., Aviation Services, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275,
283-84, 119 A.2d 761, 766 (1956); City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199
Va. 679, 685-86, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1958).
35. Johnston, supra note 14, at 332.
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ranking, 36 the inconsistencies in the test's application, 37 the inability of the test to deal with conflicts between governmental
units of equal rank,38 and the test's failure to recognize that all
units of local government are "equally 'agents of the state.' 39
Critics note further that the superior sovereign test neither recognizes that a government's superior ranking does not guarantee that government's superior land use planning ability nor
ensures that the superior intruder's project furthers a greater
social utility.40 Recognizing the myriad problems with the test,

courts have rejected it as simplistic and lacking in reasoned
41
analysis.
The criticisms of the superior sovereign test all relate to its
major weakness: it fails to protect the host from unilateral and
irresponsible decision making. Although a state agency, for example, may adopt extensive safety procedures and engage in a
lengthy study of the potential impact of its action during the
site selection process,4 2 the absence of the local host's input on
issues of land use control may cause the surrounding properties
and the health, safety, and welfare of the host's constituency to
suffer.4 3 Implicit in the decisions that continue to apply the superior sovereign test, however, is the countervailing concern
that the superior sovereign, with a broader mission or more
general constituency within the state, should not be subject to
the whims of a local decision maker in pursuing its govern36. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
38. Note, Immunity from Zoning, supra note 14, at 790; Comment, BalancingInterests,supra note 14, at 128.
39. Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note 13, at 877.
40. Note, Immunity from Zoning, supra note 14, at 791; Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note 13, at 878.

41. See, e.g., City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens, Inc., 322 So. 2d 571, 578-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. Qd
610 (Fla. 1976); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards
& Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1237 (R.I. 1982).
42. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 221, 378 A.2d 1326,
1328 (Md. Ct. App. 1977) (interagency committee reviewed substantial number
of possible sites for state correctional institution before making final recommendation); Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Mo. 1970)
(consulting engineers' study determined most appropriate size and location for
proposed facility); In re Suntide Inn Motel, Oklahoma City, 563 P.2d 125, 127
(Okla. 1977) (state corrections department conducted extensive site selection
procedure).
43. See City of Temple Terrace,322 So. 2d at 578-79 (noting that "[t]he decision of a person administering an outlying function of a state agency with respect to the site where this function should be performed is not necessarily
any better than the decision of the local authority on the subject of land use.").
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mental tasks. The superior sovereign test thus embodies the
presumption that because a greater public good is being served
by a state highway project than by a local zoning ordinance, for
example, the intruder should be free from local control. Unfortunately, the courts adopting this rule erroneously equate the
importance of the project with the need to spare the intruder
the inconvenience of responding to and accommodating the legitimate concerns of the host. Recognizing the importance of
host input in the decision making process would, however, go a
long way toward answering the criticisms directed at the superior sovereign test. 44
Notwithstanding all its shortcomings, the superior sovereign test correctly recognizes that the identity of the disputing
governmental units is a relevant consideration in allocating the
land use right. Unfortunately, the test focuses on an abstract
hierarchy of state sovereignty rather than on an assessment of
the relationship between the two units themselves. An examination of that intergovernmental relationship reveals important
facts about the ability of the host's decision making bodies to
accommodate the competing interests and helps to assess the
likelihood that the host's legitimate concerns will prompt cooperation and compromise by the intruder. A consideration of
these facts in turn suggests the proper choice between intruder
immunity and host control in those instances in which the host
government has failed to give its approval for the intruder's
45
project.
C.

THE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION TEST

The third traditional immunity test, which turns on
whether the intruder was exercising a governmental rather
than proprietary function,46 developed as a judicial response to
the breadth of the first two immunity rules. Some courts originally used this theory as a way to limit the intruder's immunity
from host control by holding that only governmental functions
were entitled to immunity.4 7 On that basis, for example, courts
have classified municipally owned waterworks 48 and waste dis44.
45.

46.

See infra text accompanying notes 147-62.
See infra text accompanying notes 165-216.
See, e.g., City of Vinita Park v. Girls Sheltercare, Inc.,

664 S.W.2d 256,

262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); City of Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 135 W.
Va. 666, 675, 64 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1951).
47. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977).
48. E.g., Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 3 Ill. 2d 388, 405, 121 N.E.2d 495,
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posal facilities 49 as proprietary functions and thus subject to
host control. In contrast, courts have held that prisons, 50 courthouse facilities, 51 and firehouses5 2 constitute immune governmental functions.5 3
Dissatisfaction with the governmental versus proprietary
test in zoning immunity cases parallels the widespread criticism
of the test in other areas of law.54 Inconsistent decisions are
perhaps the inevitable result of applying such a nebulous concept to the continually evolving role of government. 5 5
56
Although a number of state courts continue to apply the rule,
505 (1954); Taber v. City of Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 525, 274 N.W. 324,
325 (1937).
49. E.g., Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 440, 55 So.
2d 196, 200 (1951); O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, 239 A.D. 555, 558-59, 268
N.Y.S. 173, 176-77 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935).
50. E.g., City of New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (La. 1978);
County Comm'rs v. Conservation Comm'n, 380 Mass. 706, 711, 405 N.E.2d 637,
642 (1980); Green County v. City of Monroe, 3 Wis. 2d 196, 199-200, 87 N.W.2d
827, 829 (1958).
51. County of Cheshire v. City of Keene, 114 N.H. 56, 57, 314 A.2d 639, 640
(1974).
52. Nunes v. Town of Bristol, 102 R.I. 729, 734, 232 A.2d 775, 778 (R.I.
1967).
53. More than one of the three traditional tests for immunity may be applied within the same state. Compare, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset
Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 38-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (applying eminent domain test
to hold Sunset Hills zoning ordinance inapplicable to property acquired by
Kirkwood within Sunset Hills for a public swimming pool) with City of Vinita
Park v. Girls Sheltercare, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 256, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (immunizing the county from city zoning ordinances when engaged in the exercise of
a governmental function). For a listing of numerous cases applying the governmental-proprietary test, see South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22
Wash. App. 738, 742, 591 P.2d 877, 880 (1979).
54. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the
Court rejected a similar standard in the context of the tenth amendment, noting its unwieldiness and difficulty of application. Id at 539. See also,
Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936) (criticizing the standard's application
to tort law).
55. Compare Village of Larchmont v. Town of Mamaroneck, 239 N.Y. 551,
47 N.E. 191 (1924) (exempting municipal water works from host control) with
cases cited supra note 48. Compare also Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of
Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957) (exempting ancillary aspects of municipal garbage disposal system from town's zoning
classifications) with cases cited supra note 49.
56. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637
(1962); Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140
N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957). For some courts, the governmental label
appears to serve mainly as a buttress for another basis of decision. See, e.g.,
City of New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (La. 1978); City Comm'rs v.
Conservation Corm'n, 380 Mass. 706, 711, 713, 405 N.E.2d 637, 639, 641 (1980);
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many others have persuasively argued for abandoning it, noting
its difficulty of application and suggesting that the distinction
57
between governmental and proprietary functions is illusory.
In connection with the latter problem, one court has suggested
that the increasing governmental involvement in many new areas may lead to the conclusion that all lawful municipal func58
tions should receive the immunity label of governmental.
Although criticism of the governmental function test inevitably focuses on the test's grant of unguided and unprincipled
discretion to the court, that same feature seems to account for
its once widespread popularity.5 9 That is, the test allows courts
to consider factors such as the intruder's need for the project
and the project's potential negative impact. 60 A conclusion that
the intruder's project was governmental, therefore, reflected
the court's decision that the project was too important to the
61
general welfare to be subjected to local host control.
Whatever its original justification, however, application of the
test either operates to obscure the court's real analysis or results in application of a label whose relevance to the real dispute is dubious at best.
The widespread criticism of the three immunity tests has
persuasively revealed their many defects and has been instrumental in the gradual decline in their use. The tests share the
Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 280, 281, 119 A.2d
761, 764 (1956).
57. Dearden v. City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 261-62, 269 N.W.2d 139, 140
(1978); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 275-76,
242 N.W.2d 849, 854-55 (1976); Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584, 141 A.2d 308, 311 (1958); City of Fargo v. Harwood
Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1977); City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 180, 360 A.2d 607, 610-11 (1976); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (R.I.
1982).
58. Oswald v. Westchester County Park Comm'n, 234 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-68
(Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 1139, 239 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1963). Interestingly,
this court applies the governmental function test despite its recognition that
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is less than
clear. See i&i at 468-69.
59. The test has been characterized as the majority or plurality rule. See
Johnston, supra note 14, at 328 & n.5.
60. See Note, GovernmentalImmunity, supra note 13, at 871-74.
61. See Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624, 256 A.2d 457 (1969)
and the discussion of that case in Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note
13, at 873-74. See also Comment, Balancing Interests, supra note 14, at 133.
The Supreme Court of Arizona adopted this approach, holding that an intruder's proposed sewage disposal plant was an immune governmental project,
characterizing it as a "stark necessity." City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court,
90 Ariz. 393, 398, 368 P.2d 637, 640 (1962).
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same basic characteristic: the application of conclusory labels
that do not reflect the relevant factors involved in an intergovernmental dispute. In addition, the tests dichotomize the decision in any given case as a choice between unbridled intruder
immunity and absolute host control. In doing so, the tests fail
to facilitate the compromise that could be achieved between the
two conflicting yet legitimate assertions of governmental power
by simply requiring the intruder to request host approval for
the project. Moreover, the traditional tests ignore the relevance of the relationship between the governmental units and
the powerful extrajudicial incentives for compromise and
62
cooperation.
II.

JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE TRADITIONAL
IMMUNITY TESTS

In Rutgers, The State University v. Piluso63 and Town of
Oronoco v. City of Rochester,64 the New Jersey and Minnesota
Supreme Courts rejected the traditional immunity tests and established a new balancing of interests test. These contemporaneous yet apparently independent holdings65 form the
touchstone of the current trends in intergovernmental immunity disputes. Since their adoption in the early 1970s, at least
twelve other state courts have considered the new balancing
tests. While some of those courts have adopted the new test in
its entirety, other courts have adopted only parts of the holdings. In addition, several courts have suggested significant mod66
ifications to the original balancing test.

A. THE PURE BALANCING TEST
1.

Rutgers, The State University v. Piluso

In 1969, Rutgers, the state university of New Jersey, was
experiencing a severe housing shortage. In an attempt to alleviate the shortage, the university planned to build several hundred student apartment units on land it owned in the township
62. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
63. 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972).
64. 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
65. Piluso was decided three months before Oronoco. The New Jersey
court relied on Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note 13. 60 N.J. at 150,
286 A.2d at 701. The Minnesota court cited a different legal commentator advocating the balancing approach. Oronoco, 293 Minn. at 471 n.5, 197 N.W.2d at
429 n.5 (citing Note, Municipal Power to Regulate Building Constructionand
Land Use by Other State Agencies, 49 MINN. L. REV. 284 (1964)).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 108-24.
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of Piscataway. Rutgers had, however, already built the maximum number of dormitory units permissible under the Piscataway zoning ordinance. 67 After the university failed in its
attempts to obtain first a building permit and later a variance
from the township's board of adjustment, it filed suit in state
court asserting immunity from the township's zoning
ordinance.
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
decision granting immunity to the university. 68 In the course of
its decision, the court criticized the traditional immunity tests'
69
application of "absolute," "ritualistic," and "simplistic" labels
and asserted that the issue of intergovernmental immunity requires "reasoned adjudication of the critical question of which
governmental interest should prevail in the particular relationship or factual situation." 70 Surveying its prior holdings in the
area,7 1 the court rejected the traditional immunity labels and
concluded that courts should consider at least five factors when
confronted with an intergovernmental immunity controversy:
"the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity,
the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned and the
impact upon legitimate local interests. '72 The court emphasized, however, that no single factor would necessarily control
and that no precise formula could be established. Applying its
newly formulated test to the facts of Piluso, the court concluded that the university was entitled to immunity from Pis67. Piluso, 60 N.J. at 146-47, 286 A.2d at 699. Specifically, the ordinance
purported to limit only the number of units for married students and their
families. Id As the court explained, the township hoped that this type of ordinance would stem the growth of housing that would normally have high
numbers of children and a low tax base. Id
68. For the trial court's decision, see 113 N.J. Super. 65, 272 A.2d 573
(1972). The township's appeal was certified directly to the supreme court. Piluso, 60 N.J. at 144, 286 A.2d at 698.
69. 60 N.J. at 150, 286 A.2d at 701.

70. Id
71. Id at 151-52, 286 A.2d at 701-02. See Washington Township v. Village
of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958) (decision to erect water storage
facility arbitrary); Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275,
119 A.2d 761 (1956) (township ordinance not applicable to municipal airport);
Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658
(1955) (local ordinances not applicable to construction of highway service areas); Hill v. Borough of Collingswood, 9 N.J. 369, 88 A.2d 506 (1952) (park commission authorized to lease clubhouse and tennis courts).
72. 60 N.J. at 153, 286 A.2d at 702.
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cataway's zoning ordinance. As the state university, Rutgers
was performing "an essential governmental function for the
benefit of all the people of the state." 73 The court reasoned
that the legislature did not intend to give local municipalities
control over the growth and development of this endeavor, or
74
for that matter, over any other state project.
In formulating its new balancing test, however, the Piluso
court included an important caveat. Stressing the need for intergovernmental cooperation, the court cautioned against the
unbridled and arbitrary exercise of immunity in disregard of legitimate local interests. At the least, the court urged, the intruding governmental unit should consult with local authorities
and attempt to minimize host concerns.75 Convinced that
Rutgers had in fact acted reasonably in response to local opposition, the Piluso court found that authorizing Rutgers's building project in contravention of Piscataway's zoning ordinance
76
would not thwart any legitimate land use concerns.
The New Jersey court explicitly characterized its new test
as the proper means for determining legislative intent with respect to the particular intruding agency or other governmental
unit.7 7 In reality, however, the test applies only in those situations in which it is impossible to ascertain honestly the relevant
legislative intent. In fact, the Piluso court made its decision
without regard to any explicit statutory guidance. The court
simply weighed the strength of each unit's claims and the relative public interests involved. In the court's own words, the
choice between intruder immunity and host control depended
on a "value judgment reached on an overall evaluation. '78
73. Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703. The court expressed its total disapproval of
the township's "astonishing" argument that the university should build more
classrooms rather than more dormitories. These important policy decisions
are exclusively within the competence of the educational authorities. Id. at

150, 286 A.2d at 701.
74. Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703. The court noted that "all state functions
and agencies" will generally be immune from local land use regulation. Id.
75. Id. at 153-54, 286 A.2d at 703.
76. Id. at 154, 286 A.2d at 703. The court recognized that Piscataway's opposition to the project was based on its fear of incurring the additional cost of
educating increased numbers of new children brought in by the housing construction. Id. It concluded, however, that this fiscal interest was not a legitimate land use concern. Id. New Jersey has vigorously denounced fiscal zoning
as an impermissible exercise of the police power. See Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
77. Piluso, 60 N.J. at 152, 286 A.2d at 702.
78.

Id.
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Thus, despite the Piluso court's assertions to the contrary, the
Piluso test is nothing more than a pure balancing test based on
an overall subjective judicial assessment of the particular controversy at issue7 9
In applying its new test, the Piluso court undertook a de
novo review of the evidence presented in the case. This level of
review was presumably related to the fact that the balancing
test fails to require that the intruding governmental unit participate in the host's decision making procedures. Although
Rutgers did apply for a variance in this case, the Piluso court
did not review the township's decision to deny the request. Instead, the court independently evaluated the merits of
Rutgers's claims and its showing of good faith in consulting
with local officials.
Thus, the New Jersey rule focuses on preventing irresponsible intruder decision making; it does not, however, attack the
possible negative effects of unilateral decision making with
equal fervor. A recent lower court opinion illustrates the problem. In Pemberton Township v. State,8 0 the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's holding that had encouraged the State Department of Corrections
to seek a variance in its plan to locate a group home for juvenile delinquents in a residential area of Pemberton Township.8 1
The trial court had insisted that the host objectors be given a
significant opportunity to voice their concerns so that the intruder would either accommodate those concerns or, in the alternative, give valid reasons for ignoring them. 2 The appellate
court disagreed, noting the state's deliberate decision making
process and its independent assessment of community objections.8 3 Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked the trial
court's concern that the state, no matter how reasonable, was
79. In fact, other courts have expressly adopted the balancing test because
of the absence of expressed legislative intent. E.g., Brown v. Kansas Forestry,

Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 112, 576 P.2d 230, 237 (1978); City
of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 696 (N.D. 1977); Blackstone
Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233,
1237-40 (R.I. 1982).
80. 178 N.J. Super. 346, 429 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1981).
81. 171 N.J. Super. 287, 308-09, 408 A.2d 832, 843 (Law Div. 1979), rev'd,
178 N.J. Super. 346, 429 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1981).
82. I&
83. As the court noted, the Department routinely operated with "a finely
tuned sensitivity to local sentiment, at least partially self-protective because of
the perception that a community-based program cannot succeed in the face of
substantial community hostility." 178 N.J. Super. at 351-52, 429 A.2d at 363.
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making unilateral decisions on the implementation of the
project.
2.

Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester

In a decision issued three months after Piluso, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a similar balancing test in Town of
Oronoco v. City of Rochester.84 The controversy in Oronoco involved a county's refusal to grant a special use permit to a city
that sought to build a solid waste disposal system on land it
owned within the county. Without reviewing the trial court's
decision to overturn the local board of adjustment's denial of a
special use permit, the Oronoco court held that the city of
Rochester should be immune from the county's zoning

ordinances. 85
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Piluso, the Oronoco court refused to require intruder participation in local procedures, choosing instead to engage in its own de novo
balancing.8 6 Recognizing that the "pungent realities of urban
sprawl and overpopulation"81 have made land use controls
more vital than ever, the court nevertheless cautioned against
"the danger in too readily assuming enlightenment where none
in fact may exist in the implementation of a particular local
zoning policy.18 8 Turning to the case at hand, the court
stressed the city's urgent need for a new waste disposal site and
noted that the state pollution control agency, which is responsible for dealing with local environmental concerns, had granted
the city a permit to construct the facility at the county site.8 9
On the basis of these two facts, the Oronoco court concluded
that the balance should be struck in favor of intruder immunity
and thus exempted the city of Rochester from the county's zoning ordinances.
Paralleling the Piluso example further, the Oronoco court
attempted to fashion a rule that guarantees responsible decision
making by intruding governmental units. Unlike the Piluso
court, however, the Oronoco court did not stress the necessity
for intergovernmental cooperation at the local level. 90 Rather,
84. 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
85. Id. at 472, 197 N.W.2d at 429.
86. For criticisms of the Piluso balancing test, see supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
87. 293 Minn. at 471, 197 N.W.2d at 429.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 472, 197 N.W.2d at 429.
90. Although it is true that state agencies are charged with enforcing the
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it expressed confidence that the state pollution control agency
had adequately responded to all legitimate host concerns.9 1

B. JuDIcIAL RESPONSES TO THE BALANCING
1.

TEST

The Legislative Intent Test

Recently, in Commonwealth Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association,92 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected the balancing test in favor of what it
found to be a more concrete and specific rule of statutory construction.9 3 Specifically, the court held that when the legislastate's environmental policy, it is not necessarily the case that an agency will
consider site-specific concerns such as traffic flow, aesthetic considerations and
safety, and the preservation of natural resources. See, e.g., Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Auth., 194 N.J. Super. 199, 204, 476 A.2d 816,
819 (App. Div. 1984); Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 456 (S.D.
1977). These concerns can best be addressed by requiring intruder participation in local land use procedures. Such a requirement would sensitize the intruder to the peculiar local concerns in each case and would force the intruder
to deal with those concerns as a responsible unit of government. See infra
notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
91. Oronoco, 293 Minn. at 472, 197 N.W.2d at 429. Only the Supreme
Courts of Oklahoma and Rhode Island have adopted the pure balancing test.
See Independent School Dist. No. 89 v. City of Oklahoma City, 722 P.2d 1212,
1216 (Okla. 1986); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1239-40 (R.I. 1982). In Blackstone Park, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the State Department of Labor's proposed rehabilitation center for injured workers was immune from Providence's zoning ordinance. Applying the balancing test to determine where the
"broader public interest" lay, id at 1239, the court made three basic findings.
First, it concluded that the state's provision of vital rehabilitative therapy was
paramount to the city's interests and to the concerns of the small group of affected property owners. Second, the court noted that the state had made reasonable efforts to accommodate local needs, even though the state agency had
not requested local zoning approval. And third, because of the presence of
similar uses in the area, the court concluded that the state's proposal would
not constitute "the antithesis of sound land use for its specific site." Id. A review of the three justifications offered in support of its decision to grant immunity reveals that Blackstone Park suffers from the shortcomings inherent
in the pure balancing test. First, it required the court to choose one governmental interest as superior to another. Second, it concluded that evidence of
reasonable intruder decision making was sufficient to override the host's attempts to become involved in the implementation of the state agency's basic
policy decision. Finally, it required the court, rather than the relevant local
authorities, to make the initial assessment of the land use impact of the proposed project.
92. 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984).
93. The court concluded that the balancing test it had previously adopted
constituted an objectionable "ad hoc judicial legislation of authority to the governmental unit which, in the circumstances, seems to have the most compelling case." Id at 626, 483 A.2d at 454.
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ture did not reveal its intent as to which governmental unit
should prevail in an intergovernmental zoning dispute, the relevant rule of statutory construction required that the court
weigh the consequences of granting intruder immunity against
the consequences of favoring host control. Under this test, the
statutory interpretation that maximizes the exercise of both admittedly legitimate powers should be favored by the court.9 4
The Ogontz case involved a municipal zoning ordinance
that excluded a proposed state facility for the mentally handicapped from a residential district. Stressing its duty to effectuate legislative intent, the Ogontz court first reviewed its
previous applications of the balancing test; the court found the
holdings in these cases to be inconsistent. In one case, the court
had held that the delegation of power to school districts to acquire land evidenced a "'precise and specific' 95 legislative intent to grant school district immunity from host zoning. In
contrast, another case held that a similar grant of land acquisition power to the Bureau of Corrections did not reflect a legislative intent to immunize the intruding state agency. 96
Comparing the relevant legislative provisions in those two
cases, the Ogontz court concluded that the different results reflected different judicial balancings of the equities involved,
rather than a difference in legislative intent.97
Uncomfortable with the application of a balancing test that
"has nothing to do with legislative intent"9 8 and that leads to
"uncertain results at every level," 99 the Ogontz court announced a return to the task of determining legislative intent.
94. Id. at 628, 483 A.2d at 455.
95. Id. at 627, 483 A.2d at 454 (quoting Pemberton Appeal, 434 Pa. 249, 256,
252 A.2d 597, 600 (1969)).
96. Id. In Pemberton Appeal, 434 Pa. 249, 252 A.2d 597 (1969), the relevant statutory provision granted the school district the power to "locate, determine, acquire, and if necessary condemn, all real estate deemed necessary for
schools." Id. at 256, 252 A.2d at 600. In comparison, the legislation involved in
City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976), delegated to the Bureau of Corrections the power "'to establish... such prisoner
pre-release centers at such locations throughout the Commonwealth as it may
deem necessary.'"
97. Ogontz, 505 Pa. at 627, 483 A.2d at 454. Somewhat incongruously, the
court noted that it did not disagree with the result reached in the two cases.
Id- If the goal is to ascertain legislative intent, and if the legislative intent was
indistinguishable in the two cases, it is unclear how the court would have
reached the same results by applying its newly announced test of legislative
intent.
98. Id at 627, 483 A.2d at 455.
99. Id. at 626, 483 A.2d at 454.
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With the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act as its
guide,1 0 0 the court held that when the legislative intent is ambiguous, intent must be determined by considering the consequences of a particular statutory interpretation. 10 '
Applying the rule to the case before it, the court decided
that only one of the two possible resolutions of the conflict
would give effect to both legislative mandates; that is, the delegation of the municipal power to zone and the grant of agency
power to establish mental health facilities. Granting intruder
immunity would frustrate the city's zoning scheme; application
of the city's zoning ordinance, however, would only force the
state to exercise its power at another site. Applying its newly
formulated rule, the court concluded that granting host control
to the city would better reflect the legislative mandates of both
statutes.10 2 Unfortunately, the court did not consider whether
the state had valid reasons for choosing the disputed site over
10 3
allegedly suitable alternative sites.
The Pennsylvania court's legislative intent test attempts to
maximize the implementation of two conflicting, delegated
powers. The Ogontz court assumed that its holding would not
prevent the state agency from establishing mental health facilities, but would merely require the state to address the host's legitimate concerns. In this respect, the Ogontz test is
indistinguishable from the balancing test's focus on the specific
exercise of the intruder's power in the context of the host's municipal regulations. 04 The Ogontz test differs from the pure
balancing test, however, in its assumption that, so long as the
host does not try to exclude an intruder's project entirely, the
courts will allow the host's regulations to apply. 10 5
100. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
101. 505 Pa. at 627, 483 A.2d at 455.
102. 1I at 628, 483 A.2d at 455.
103. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 190, 360
A.2d 607, 615 (Eagen, J., dissenting) ("[Z]oning boards have no expertise in determining locations which will aid in the rehabilitation process, particularly at
such a crucial stage as readjustment to a free environment.").
104. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 332, 335-340.
105. 505 Pa. at 628, 483 A.2d at 455. See also Borough of Tunkhannock v.
County of Wyoming, 507 A.2d 438 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), in which the court
exempted the county's proposed reconstruction of a prison in violation of the
host borough's zoning ordinance, noting that application of the zoning ordinance would force the county to build on another site, at a much greater cost
to taxpayers. Compare, Township of Middleton v. County of Delaware, - Pa.
-, 511 A.2d 811 (1986) in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a township zoning ordinance inapplicable to a county's plan to construct a waste-toenergy plant on the premises of a county geriatric center. Concluding that
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As the Ogontz case illustrates, the application of the legislative intent test depends more on whether the host's intent is
to exclude the intruder or whether it is merely to condition the
intruder's exercise of power than it does on a court's determination that the legislature intended to immunize the intruder
or, conversely, to grant host control. Dichotomizing the issue
and presenting it as a choice between those two absolutes, however, makes the goal of intergovernmental cooperation and
0 8
compromise difficult to attain.
In sum, the legislative intent test correctly assumes that
the legislature expected the intruding governmental unit to exercise its delegated power within the territorial jurisdiction of
another government. The test conditions the exercise of host
control on a showing that the intruder's project will not be
completely thwarted. By focusing on the host's posture in the
particular case, the test also properly reflects the presumed legislative desire for host accommodation of the intruder's project.
Because it does not mandate intruder participation in host procedures, however, the test does not go far enough toward maximizing intergovernmental negotiation. Moreover, the test
becomes inadequate in those cases in which legislative intent is
indecipherable, negotiations have failed, and both governments
state legislation prevented the township's zoning power from applying to the
county project, the court found Ogontz inapplicable. Id. at -, 511 A.2d at 814.
Michigan has adopted a similar test of legislative intent. In Dearden v.
City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978), the Supreme Court of
Michigan held that a statute's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" over penal institutions revealed a legislative intent to immunize the intruding department
from host control. A contrary statutory interpretation, the court noted, would
allow communities to prohibit the establishment of penal institutions across
the state. Id. at 267, 269 N.W.2d at 143. Unlike the Pennsylvania court, however, the Dearden court neither discussed the host community's specific objections to the project, nor considered the effect of granting host control in the
specific case.
106. For examples of courts' continued polarization of the issue by characterizing it as an either-or choice between immunity and host control, compare
City of Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 423 Mich. 466, 378 N.W.2d 402
(1985) (statute authorizing adult foster homes construed as exempting the
homes from the host community's zoning, thus eliminating the need to participate in the local host government's zoning procedures) with Cody Park Ass'n
v. Royal Oak School Dist., 116 Mich. App. 103, 321 N.W.2d 855 (1982) (school
district subject to host control). As this Article will suggest, intruder participation in local proceedings should always result; requiring it only in cases
where the court reaches a conclusion of nonimmunity may have the negative
result of focusing the original negotiations between the conflicting governmental units on the debate between immunity and host control, rather than on
how best to protect both units' interests. See infra text accompanying notes
147-62.
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the legislative inassert reasonable arguments. At that point,
07
tent test requires a resort to balancing.
2.

The "Presumption of Host Control" Test

A plurality of the courts that have rejected the three traditional tests in favor of the Piluso-Oronoco pure balancing approach have modified that test to such an extent that
application of the balancing label is strained at best. A review
of the rules adopted by the courts of Florida, L 8 South Daand Ohio1 1 2 reveals that
kota, 0 9 North Dakota,110 Kansas,'
these courts share the pure balancing test's criticism of the
three traditional tests. These courts point to the inflexibility of
the mechanistic rules that typically led to intruder immunity;
like the Piluso and Oronoco courts, they note that the increasing complexity of urban society requires attention to the host's
land use concerns to ensure more responsible decision making
107. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. Board of Standards &
Appeals, - Pa. Commw. -, 509 A.2d 970 (1986), in which the court had to rule
on the applicability of the city's fire regulations to the State Bureau of Corrections' proposed renovation and expansion of a state penitentiary. The city's
fire code would require a sprinkler head in each cell; the bureau claimed, however, that the sprinkler system would be inappropriate and potentially dangerous, noting the inmates could set the system off, razor blades could be hidden
in the sprinkler heads, and the inmates could use the system to commit suicide
by hanging. The court's holding that the state bureau was entitled to a variance involved a balancing of hardships and legitimate governmental interests.
108. See Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple
Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976). In this case, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the court of appeals' opinion, 322 So. 2d 571, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), as its own. 332 So. 2d at 612.
109. See Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977).
110. See City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D.
1977).
111. See Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d
102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978). The Kansas Supreme Court has expressly declined to
apply the court of appeals' balancing test in a case involving application of a
city's building, plumbing, electrical, and mechanical codes to the state university's project for expansion of its medical center. State v. City of Kansas City,
228 Kan. 25, 612 P.2d 578 (1980). The Kansas court did, however, reserve judgment on the applicability of the lower court's balancing test in the context of
an intergovernmental zoning dispute. 228 Kan. at 38, 612 P.2d at 587. But cf.
City of East Cleveland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 Ohio St. 2d 33, 430
N.E.2d 458 (1982) (Ohio's new balancing test applies to determine application
of city building code to county school for mentally retarded.); Pal-Mar Water
Management Dist. v. Martin County, 377 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (concluding that Florida's balancing test for zoning disputes should apply
equally to local permit requirements).
112. See Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367
(1980).
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by the intruder.113 Unlike the pure balancers, however, these
courts have insisted that the intruder participate in local host
proceedings. They cite various justifications for this absolute
requirement. One court noted that the local administrative resolution of conflict is more expeditious and less expensive than
adjudicated solutions.1 14 Another court expressed the belief
that utilization of a local forum would maximize harmony between governmental units.1 15 Still another saw the requirement
as the best way to ensure that the intruder would consider the
impact of its project on the host's legitimate land use concerns.1 16 By requiring participation in the relevant local procedures, the new rule forces the intruding government to respond
to local concerns. It also ensures host participation, not in the
intruder's fundamental policy decisions, but in the implementation of those policies. As a result, the rule maximizes the likelihood of accommodation and compromise between the two units,
while at the same time it minimizes the potential for unilateral
decisions by the intruder.
A review of the decisions that require the intruder to seek
local approval for its projects as the first step in intergovern113. Although it did not discuss the recent trend toward balancing in judicial review of intergovernmental conflicts, the Illinois Supreme Court recently
has recognized that "the means for achieving cooperation between independent units of government having competing interests or overlapping responsibilities cannot be reduced to a rigid mathematical formula." Wilmette Park Dist.
v. Village of Wilmette, 112 Ill. 2d 6, -, 490 N.E.2d 1282, 1286-87 (1986). In Wilmette, the court refused to decide the merits of the park district's claim of immunity from local zoning;, rather, it ordered the park district to participate in a
special use hearing before the relevant local body. The court also noted that
judicial review would be available to hear the park district's complaints of arbitrary or discriminatory village action. Id. at -, 490 N.E.2d at 1287. Thus, it
seems that Illinois has actually, though not expressly, joined with those courts
that have adopted a presumption of host control.
114. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 612 n.3 (Fla. 1976), aff'g 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975). The court of appeals' decision in the Hillsboroughcase stopped short of
imposing an absolute requirement of intruder participation in the host's process. The court raised the possibility that in some instances the state may be
convinced of the overriding public need for its proposed project and validly exempt itself from local proceedings. 322 So. 2d at 579. The court of appeals also
warned, however, that "under normal circumstances" the intruder should seek
permission for its project from the proper local authorities. Id. Likewise, the
Florida Supreme Court firmly insisted on the desirability of airing the conflict
in a local host forum. 332 So. 2d at 613. See also Pal-Mar Water Management
Dist. v. Martin County, 377 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (suggesting that the intruder should apply to the host for an exception to or
change in zoning regulations).
115. Brownfield, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 286, 407 N.E.2d at 1368.
116. Brown, 2 Kan. App. 2d at 113-14, 576 P.2d at 238-39.
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mental dispute resolution reveals at least two different formulations of the proper judicial role in that process. According to
one line of cases, a court reviewing the intruder's failed attempt
to obtain local approval should engage in its own general balancing of all interests involved. 117 These courts apply the Piluso-Oronoco rule of balancing, but only after host proceedings
at the local level have failed to result in agreement. Adopting
this approach, the Ohio Supreme Court defined the appropriate
judicial role as being "to weigh the general public purposes to
be served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in favor of that power which will serve the needs of the
greater number of our citizens."' 8
Although the requirement of mandatory intruder participation in local proceedings has numerous advantages, 1 9 defining the judicial role as that of a general balancer on a case by
case basis suffers the shortcomings noted earlier in this Article. 120 Perhaps because of a shared uneasiness with the balancing test, a second group of courts has defined the judicial role
more narrowly. These courts retain the requirement of
mandatory intruder participation in local proceedings but also
require that an intruder unable to win host approval must bear
the burden of establishing that the host's refusal to grant approval was arbitrary.' 2 ' Implicit in this additional requirement
is the decision to favor host control over intruder immunity.
Unless exercised arbitrarily, the host's zoning power will take
precedence over the intruder's proposal in cases of failed negotiations. Allocation of the land use right in this way is superior
to the general balancing test, because it provides predictability
and certainty of judicial decision, 122 and maximizes the incentive of the parties to negotiate.123 As the Article will suggest,
117. See Brownfield, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 286-87, 407 N.E.2d at 1368; Lincoln
County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 458 (S.D. 1977).
118. Brownfield, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 147-62.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
121. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., 322 So. 2d 571, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla.
1976); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102,
114, 576 P.2d 230, 239 (1978); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d
694, 698 (N.D. 1977).
122. See Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors
Ass'n, 505 Pa. 614, 627, 483 A.2d 448, 454-55 (1984).
123. When coupled with the requirement of intruder participation in host
proceedings, the rule focuses the parties' negotiations on the goals of accommodation and compromise rather than on disputes dichotomizing the issue as
an either-or choice between immunity and host control.
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however, the land use right should not be granted automatically to the host. 124 Rather, a preferable rule would allocate
the right of host control or intruder immunity on the basis of
the political relationship between the two governmental units
and the extrajudicial factors that affect the efficacy of their respective decision making processes.
III.

RETHINKING BALANCING12 5

The appeal of the balancing test seems to be the prospect it
offers courts as an attractive alternative to old categories and
labels that have become meaningless and inflexible. Balancing,
claim its supporters, is modern, flexible, and produces equitable
and reasoned results. 2 6 And, in fact, a review of the cases applying the balancing test bears out the truth of many of those
claims. Balancing courts deny immunity if the intruder's decision making process was irresponsible. 2 7 Immunity is also denied if the intruder was unable to articulate plausible
justifications for seeking an exemption from the host's regulations.12S At the same time, however, the balancing test suffers
from a number of serious countervailing shortcomings that appear to have gone unnoticed by the test's enthusiasts. 29
124. See infra text accompanying notes 165-216.
125. This section also considers the weaknesses in the other judicial
reactions to the traditional immunity tests, namely, the legislative intent test,
see supra text accompanying notes 92-107, and the presumption of host control
test, see su1pra text accompanying notes 108-24.
126. See Johnston, supra note 14; Note, Immunity from Zoning, supra
note 14; Note, Governmental Immunity, supra note 13. For decisions that
adopt this position, see supra note 15.
127. See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 699
(N.D. 1977) (no immunity where intruder took no formal action to study alternative sites and waste disposal methods).
128. Compare, e.g., Pemberton Township v. State, 178 N.J. Super. 346, 34853, 429 A.2d 360, 361-63 (App. Div. 1981) (granting immunity where intruder
was able to justify its plan to place a home for juvenile delinquents in the particular community) with Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2
Kan. App. 2d 102, 113-14, 576 P.2d 230, 238-39 (1978) (no immunity where assertion of immunity was apparently arbitrary).
129. At least three courts have expressly rejected the balancing test in the
resolution of intergovernmental conflicts: Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens
v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 490, 314
S.E.2d 218, 223 ("We reject the balancing-of-interests test, because it suffers
too severely from its admitted flaws, i.e., it is too nebulous and judicially unmanageable."), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802 (1984); Seward County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 276, 242 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1976) (noting the balancing test's "lack of guidelines" and "increased difficulties of application"); Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n,
505 Pa. 614, 627, 483 A.2d 448, 454 (1984) ("Whatever the virtue there may be
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On a practical level, a state court's decision to adopt the
balancing test may have several negative effects on the intergovernmental conflict resolution process itself. First, it potentially misdirects the original contacts between the two
governmental units by encouraging them to argue the merits of
immunity and host control. In essence, the balancing test holds
out the hope that the assertion of an uncompromising stance of
complete immunity or absolute host control may ultimately be
successful. To some extent, then, it provides a disincentive for
negotiated compromise at the local level.
Two recent lower court cases illustrate this problem. In
Pal-Mar Water Management District v. Martin County,1 30 a
water management district sought to excavate canals and
ditches on lands located within the host county. The district
did not seek county permits, nor did it discuss its plan with
county officials. As the appellate court noted, "Pal-Mar was apparently so convinced that it was exempt from the permit requirements it chose to proceed without resort to local
authorities. 1 31 After balancing the interests, the court found
no reason to exempt the intruder and permanently enjoined
the water district from proceeding with its excavation plans until it obtained the necessary county permits. Similarly, in
Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Authority, 32
a New Jersey township sued to stop the construction of a sewerage pumping station begun by the regional sewerage authority without township approval. Noting the legitimate local
concerns embodied in the township's site plan approval and
building permit requirements, 33 the appellate court reversed
the lower court's holding of intruder immunity and ordered the
sewerage authority to seek the necessary township permits.1 34
In contrast to the balancing test, which might uphold an intruder's decision to exempt itself from local proceedings, a clear
rule requiring intruder participation in local host proceedings
would supplement the incentives for intergovernmental comin [the balancing test], it has the disability of leading to uncertain results at
every level.").
130. 377 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
131. Id-at 755.
132. 194 N.J. Super. 199, 476 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1984).
133. Id. at 204, 476 A.2d at 819 (The purposes of the township's ordinances
are "to preserve natural resources on a construction site, ensure safe and efficient traffic flow, promote aesthetic considerations and safety, conserve energy
and ensure essential services to residents and occupants.").
134. Id.
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promise and cooperation. Public officials have many reasons to
seek an alternative to the adjudication of intergovernmental
conflicts. The most obvious reason is the high cost of litigation
in terms of both time and money.135 Moreover, local officials
realize that their relationship with the intruding government is
a permanent one that requires frequent contact. Courts should
therefore require that the intruding governmental unit always
seek local approval. In the likely event that host approval is
will be
granted on terms satisfactory to the intruder, litigation 136
avoided and important local concerns will be protected.
A second, related flaw in the balancing test is that it may
actually increase the volume of litigation. For example, application of the test may require two rounds of litigation: first, to
determine whether the balance should be struck in favor of
host control or intruder immunity; and second, to consider
whether the party who received the right in the first round of
litigation has exercised it properly. 3 7 In addition, the test may
operate as an incentive for litigation and appeal by holding out
to the losing party the hope that the next court will balance differently than the previous one.' 38 Because the result of a balancing test is always indeterminate until the jurisdiction's
highest court has issued its opinion, the test fosters uncertainty,
which in turn fosters litigation. In fact, intergovernmental litigation in jurisdictions adopting a balancing approach has frequently produced a series of court opinions expressing opposite
conclusions about the proper balance to be struck in a particu135. For an excellent summary of the powerful incentives for intergovernmental cooperation, see R. BISH & V. OSTROM, supra note 30, at 66-68.
136. In Shupack, for instance, the court noted that the township categorically disclaimed any desire to interfere with or prohibit the water district's
project. Rather, the township's goal in asserting the applicability of its ordinance was to ensure that the water district implement its project in a way that
would minimize the negative effects for township residents. 194 N.J. Super. at
205, 476 A.2d at 819.
137. See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.
1977). In City of Fargo the court held that the city was not exempt from township zoning regulations in its proposed construction of a sanitary landfill but
noted that the court could later be called on to determine whether the township exercised its host control in an arbitrary manner. Id at 700.
138. Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n,
505 Pa. 614, 627, 483 A.2d 448, 454-55 (1984). In fact, of the reported post-Piluso cases in New Jersey, appellate reversal of the trial court's application of
the balancing test is not uncommon. See, e.g., Shupack v. Manasquan River
Regional Sewerage Auth., 194 N.J. Super. 199, 476 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1984);
Town of Morristown v. Township of Hanover, 168 N.J. Super. 292, 402 A.2d 983
(App. Div. 1979).
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lar case.' 39 Of course, inconsistent results at different stages in
the judicial process are not a sufficient reason to reject a balancing test, which by definition requires difficult line drawing
and subjective evaluation of all relevant facts. If, however, a
definite rule could predict the proper balance to be struck in a
given case, it would replace the nebulous subjectivity of the balancing test with desirable certainty and predictability.
A third shortcoming of the balancing test is its propensity
for involving the court in the original land use decision. In deciding whether to exempt an intruder from host control, courts
adopting the balancing test must consider the effects of the project on local land use concerns. In doing so, these courts assume the roles of the local administrative and legislative bodies,
but act without the local decision maker's familiarity with local
140
conditions.
A fourth practical problem inherent in the pure balancing
test is that, while it does guard against irresponsible decision
making by the intruder, it fails to protect vigorously the host
from the negative effects of unilateral decision making. 141 A
balancing court may decide, for example, that the overriding
public interest being served by the intruder's project compels
the conclusion of intruder immunity. So long as the intruder
refrains from arbitrarily trampling on valid local concerns, it
will remain immune from the application of host regulation.
Such an approach unnecessarily polarizes the issue. The presence of an overriding public interest does not render host input
and participation in the implementation of the project inappropriate. Again, a rule requiring intruder involvement in local
139. See, e.g., Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Auth., 194
N.J. Super. 199, 476 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1984); Pemberton Township v. State,

178 N.J. Super. 346, 429 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1981).

140. See, e.g., Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan.

App. 2d 102, 114, 576 P.2d 230, 239 (1978) ("It seems to us that, on balance, the
initial decision on reasonableness in this case can be made more expeditiously
and with greater discernment by the local zoning authority-here the
county."). It was precisely this concern that prompted some courts to adopt
the additional requirement that the intruding governmental unit participate in
the host's land use proceedings and attempt to receive local authorization for
its project.
141. E.g., Farrell v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 193 N.J. Super. 554, 475 A.2d
94 (Law Div. 1984). But compare Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993
(1976), in which the court noted with approval the state's extensive consultation and negotiation with local officials and responsiveness to local concerns.
Id at 220, 364 A.2d at 1000. Unfortunately, however, the court failed to adopt
a requirement that the intruder always make application to the relevant local
zoning board. See infra text accompanying notes 147-62.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

V. 71:611
[Vol.

proceedings would force the intruder to take account of the importance of the host's concerns.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a balancing test is
an inadequate tool for allocating legal rights between two governmental units, each of which is attempting to exercise properly delegated state power and each of which is furthering an
express state policy.142 Although balancing may be appropriate

of
or even required when a court assumes, for instance, the task 143
protecting individual rights from the excesses of government,
142.

In Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, the court described the balancing

test as the proper means of divining legislative intent. 60 N.J. 142, 152, 286
A.2d 697, 702 (1972). What the court means, however, is that application of the
balancing test leads it to the choice the court would have made if it were the
legislature. See Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 505 Pa. 614, 627, 483 A.2d 448, 455 (1984) ("[The balancing test]
amounts to a judicial determination that since the legislature did not provide
for the situation at hand, the courts will."). A more honest response to this
type of intergovernmental conflict would recognize that legislative intent is indecipherable. The legislature, of course, is perfectly capable of adopting legislation that mandates host control or grants intruder immunity in particular
circumstances. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Santa Monica, 77 Cal.
App. 3d 130, 137, 143 Cal. Rptr. 276, 281 (1978); Kehoe v. City of Berkeley, 67
Cal. App. 3d 666, 672-73, 135 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 (1977); City of Orange v. Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 245, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1974); City of Santa
Clara v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157-58, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 216 (1972); County Comm'rs v. Conservation Comm'n, 380 Mass. 706,
713, 405 N.E.2d 637, 641 (1980); State v. Wind, 337 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1960); Carine v. Cliffside Park Bd. of Educ., 161 N.J. Super. 137, 139, 390
A.2d 1228, 1230 (Law Div. 1978); Passaic Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
Housing Auth., 45 N.J. Super. 381, 388, 132 A.2d 813, 816 (App. Div. 1957);
Washington County Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 99 A.D.2d 321, 324-325, 473 N.Y.S.2d
610, 613 (1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 923, 477 N.E.2d 1084, 488 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985);
Country Club Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Jefferson Metro. Hous. Auth., 5
Ohio App. 3d 77, 80, 449 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1981); Commonwealth v. DiMascio, 93
Pa. Commw. 624, 626-27, 502 A.2d 323, 324 (1985); Morse v. Vermont Dep't of
State Bldgs., 136 Vt. 253, 254, 388 A.2d 371, 372 (1978); Board of County Supervisors v. City of Roanoke, 220 Va. 195, 196 n.1, 257 S.E.2d 781, 782 n.1 (1979);
Town of Ringle v. County of Marathon, 104 Wis. 2d 297, 300-01, 311 N.W.2d
595, 597 (1981). Thus, statements to the effect that the legislature must have
intended immunity because no host control was explicitly legislated, see, e.g.,
Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 224, 378 A.2d 1326, 1329-30 (1977);
City of Portsmouth v. John T. Clark & Son, 117 N.H. 797, 798, 378 A.2d 1383,
1384 (1977); City of Santa Fe v. Armijo, 96 N.M. 663, 665, 634 P.2d 685, 687
(1981), or conversely, that the legislature must have intended host control because no immunity was explicitly legislated, see, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v.
Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 183-84, 360 A.2d 607, 612 (1976); City of Richmond
v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 686, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1958), are unhelpful and inaccurate.
143. Litigation involving religious freedom and the first amendment is a
good example. In those cases, the inconsistency in results obtained by court
application of the balancing test, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977)
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judicial balancing in the case of intergovernmental conflict requires a court to make the legislative decision of choosing one
public policy over another equally valid public policy. In practice, such judicial balancing has frequently resulted in a decision in favor of the governmental unit with a larger
constituency, thus recalling the superior sovereign test's1 44 assumption that the project of a superior governmental unit furhowever,
thers a broader public interest.145 It is not for courts,
146
to pick and choose between valid public purposes.
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("'corrosive precedents' have left us
without firm principles on which to decide these cases"); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 391 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) (Court has
abandoned traditional analysis); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 820-21 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (Court's decision inconsistent with
prior decisions); Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study
in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 784 (1978) (documenting the
Court's inconsistent decisions in governmental aid to sectarian school cases);
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
FirstAmendment and the Supreme Cour 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 15 (1978) (discussing the Court's irrelevant and inconsistent use of the Constitution), may
be justified by the need for the court to intervene to protect not only the
rights of the individual litigants and the important policies of the governmental litigant, but to draw the contours of the general role of government in relationship to first amendment freedoms. No such compelling reasons exist in
the case of intergovernmental conflict, where both parties are asserting the
right to exercise validly delegated sovereign power.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
145. See, e.g., Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697,
703 (1972) ("With regard to a state university... there can be little doubt that,
as an instrumentality of the state performing an essential governmental function for the benefit of all the people of the state, the legislature would not intend that its growth and development should be subject to restriction or
control by local land use regulation. Indeed, such will generally be true in the
case of all state functions."); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd.
of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1240 (R.I. 1982) (broad public interest
of state project paramount to interests of local residents). In fact, one court
expressly defined the balancing test in those terms: "We believe the correct
approach in these cases where conflicting interests of governmental entities
appear would be in each instance to weigh the general public purposes to be
served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in favor of
that power which will serve the needs of the greater number of our citizens."
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 285, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1980). Also,
nonbalancing courts have cited Piluso with approval for the proposition that
the state is generally immune from local regulation. See In re Suntide Inn
Motel, 563 P.2d 125, 127 (Okla. 1977).
146. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 683 (1964). In a different context,
Judge Prentice Marshall described judicial balancing of competing governmental interests as "simply impossible." In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.
1979).
Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
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IV. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFLICT
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF INTRUDER PARTICIPATION
IN HOST PROCEEDINGS

The problem facing courts in intergovernmental land use
disputes is how best to reconcile the conflicting exercise of two
legitimate governmental powers. Intruder projects usually promote important legislative goals. At the same time, local land
use regulations reflect the important state concern that land be
developed in a way that is beneficial to its citizens' health,
safety, and welfare. Courts deciding these cases must assume
that the legislature intended that both legislative policies could
be effectuated without interjurisdictional warfare.
As noted above, governmental units respond to many powerful extrajudicial incentives for intergovernmental cooperation.147 Courts should thus adopt a rule that will encourage
this nonadjudicative process. 48 Unfortunately, a rule that
characterizes the controversy as a choice between the extremes
of host control or intruder immunity does little to encourage
the desired result. Compromise would be encouraged, however,
by a rule that categorically required the intruding governmental unit to participate in good faith in all relevant local proceedings, just as if the intruder were a private party.149
147. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36. Also, see R. BIsH & V. OsTROM, supra note 30, at 68 n.20 for reference to several studies of widespread
intergovernmental cooperation.
148. For a discussion of the advantages of nonadjudicated solutions to land
use disputes, see generally G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1985).
149. To some extent, the rationale for this requirement parallels the underpinnings of the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the zoning
context. See, e.g., Johnson County Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. City of Overland
Park, 239 Kan. 221, -, 718 P.2d 1302, 1307 (1986); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d
816, 821 (Me. 1983); Bailey v. Montana Dep't of Health & Envtl. Sciences, Mont. -, 664 P.2d 325, 327 (1983); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't, 685
P.2d 550, 551 (Utah 1984); Board of Supervisors v. Market Inns, Inc., 228 Va.
82, 86-87, 319 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1984). In DeCarlo v. Town of W. Miami, 49
So. 2d 596, 596-97 (Fla. 1950), the court discussed the practical advantages of
the exhaustion rule, noting that the zoning board's findings are relevant to an
ultimate judicial determination of rights. In addition, the local officials should
have the opportunity to correct the ordinance's asserted deficiencies or, in the
alternative, state their reasons for not doing so. Id. See also Orion Corp. v.
State, 693 P.2d 1369, 1378 (Wash. 1985) (discussing the reasons for the exhaustion rule); Note, ExhaustingAdministrative and Legislative Remedies in Zoning Cases, 48 TULANE L. REV. 665 (1974) (discussing the rule and its
exceptions). The common result of the application of this rule will be to require the intruder to seek local permits and zoning approval. Although the
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The benefits of this approach are several. First, it recognizes that conflict is not inherently destructive. If channeled
properly, conflict will educate the intruding governmental unit,
which may not be aware of the consequences its actions will
have.1 50 At the same time, structured conflict may assuage the
host's collective uneasiness about, or distrust of, the unknown. 51 In essence, formal procedures will force both participants to articulate reasons, suggest alternatives, and respond to
concerns voiced by the other. All too frequently, the reported
cases involve situations in which the intruder has not participated in local proceedings, and has thus bypassed an opportu1 52
nity for amicable conflict resolution.
Second, intruder participation in the host's procedures
should be required even when it can be shown that the intruder
engaged in a reasoned decision making process and consulted
informally with local authorities. Even if, for example, a state
Supreme Court of Kansas has suggested that disputes over permit compliance
should be treated differently than zoning conflicts, see State ex. reL Schneider
v. City of Kansas City, 228 Kan. 25, 38, 612 P.2d 578, 587 (1980), no other court
seems to have made that distinction. In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court in City
of E. Cleveland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 Ohio St. 2d 23, 27-29, 430
N.E.2d 456, 459-61 (1982), explicitly applied its balancing test to require intruder adherence to both types of local regulations.
150. R. BISH & V. OsTRoM, supra note 30, at 66. In addition, courts have
recognized the value of those proceedings as an effective means for fleshing
out the facts upon which subsequent judicial review can be based. E.g., Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of Wilmette, 134 Ill. App. 3d 657, 663, 480 N.E.2d
1249, 1253 (1985), aff'd, 112 Ill. 2d 6, 490 N.E.2d 1282 (1986).
151. See, e.g., In re Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125, 129 (Okla. 1977), in
which the concurrence suggested that the host city had displayed "collective
emotionally tainted judgment." Id Unfortunately, the court used that reason
as one of the bases for granting intruder immunity rather than suggesting that
it revealed the need for dialogue and airing of views.
152. In many of the intergovernmental conflict cases, the intruder proceeded unilaterally. For a representative few of those numerous cases, see
Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332
So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1976); Pal-Mar Water Management Dist. v. Martin County,
377 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Orange County v. City of Apopka,
299 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of
Wilmette, 112 Ill. 2d 6, -, 490 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (1986); City of Des Plaines v.
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill. 2d 11, 12, 268 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1971); Brown
v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 102, 103, 576 P.2d 230,
231 (1978); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266,
269, 242 N.W.2d 849, 851 (1976); Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407
N.E.2d 1365 (1980); Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 454 (S.D.
1977); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1982). Presumably, some, if not many, of these cases
would have resulted in accord if the intruder had participated in proceedings
at the host level.
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agency engages in a detailed site selection process, 153 it may not
discover aspects of its project that would be of concern to local
residents.15 4 Local bodies such as the planning commission or
zoning board of appeals are familiar with unique local conditions and are experienced in considering the impact of different
land use projects. Moreover, local notice procedures will ensure that those most immediately affected by the proposed use
will become aware of it and have an opportunity to voice their
opinions. Although the representative officials of both governmental units may be able to agree on the details of the intruder's proposal, a compromise reached without the input of
the citizens most immediately affected by the project could
easily overlook many legitimate site-specific concerns. 5 5 Overall, the potential for delay and duplication in the implementation of the intruder's project is outweighed by the benefits
produced by ensuring that a forum for constructive conflict will
maximize the protection of both governments' legitimate
156
concerns.
153. Frequently, for example, the intruder's choice of site is the result of a
selection process that involved consideration of several alternative sites. See,
e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 221, 378 A.2d 1326, 1328 (1977);
Durand v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 70 Misc. 2d 429, 430-31, 334 N.Y.S.2d
670, 673 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 41 A.D.2d 803, 341 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1973); South
Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 739-40, 591 P.2d 877, 878
(1979).
154. See, e.g., Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Auth., 194
N.J. Super. 199, 204, 476 A.2d 816, 819 (App. Div. 1984); In re Suntide Inn
Motel, 563 P.2d 125, 130-32 (Okla. 1977) (Simms, J., dissenting); Lincoln
County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 456 (S.D. 1977).
155. In Robinson v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 467 So. 2d
911 (Miss. 1985), the city failed to adhere to its notification procedures when
the school district proposed construction of a facility that would violate local
off-street parking requirements. As a result, the planning commission's decision to approve the proposal was made without important neighbor input and
testimony as to the specific negative effects the proposal would entail. Id. at
913, 916-17.
156. In Note, Immunity from Zoning, supra note 14, at 809-10, the author
suggests that requiring the intruder always to seek local approval would diminish the public benefit. The author argues that the local procedures may be
duplicative and cause delay. Accord Town of Onondaga v. Central School
Dist., 56 Misc. 2d 26, 28-29, 287 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding township ordinances inapplicable to school district in part because court concluded
that approval of project by State Department of Education would ensure protection of health, safety, and welfare of host community). Even a responsible
intruder, however, may not be sensitive to local concerns. See cases cited
supranote 154. Moreover, the delay required to reach a judicial determination
of whether the alternative procedures adequately protected the local interest
would be much greater than requiring concurrent local proceedings. Perhaps
more fundamental, however, is the obvious benefit derived from allowing the
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Third, this approach has the advantage of narrowing the issues of conflict and thus reducing the role of the court when no
intergovernmental agreement is reached. Participation in local
proceedings will limit judicial review to the specific disputed
regulatory provisions identified during those proceedings. Unlike other governmental immunity tests, then, this rule encourages maximum dispute resolution at a nonadjudicative level
and calls on the judiciary only in those instances in which
agreement has not been reached.
Finally, a rule that requires intruder participation in local
proceedings recognizes that the need for host input and the
need for the protection of host concerns do not decrease as the
public need for the intruder's project becomes greater.
Although the host government may be powerless to override
the intruder's decision to undertake a particular project, it is
still uniquely qualified to participate in the implementation of
those policy choices. This rule therefore stresses the need for
an active partnership between the two governmental units and
forces them to meet in the forum most likely to result in com157
promise and cooperation.
A comparison between two cases illustrates the benefits of
a categorical rule requiring the intruder to seek approval from
host authorities. In In re Suntide Inn Motel,158 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the State Department of Corrections
did not have to present its proposal for a community treatment
facility to the city planning commission. Because the state had
engaged in an extensive site selection process1 59 and because
local officials who customarily deal with land use concerns to provide their input into the implementation of the project. Finally, in the case of a large
statewide project such as a highway system, which will require explicit statutory authorization and funding, it is not unreasonable to expect the legislature
to exempt the project from local proceedings if it sees fit.
157. Although a regional or statewide body might be a superior decision
maker in intergovernmental disputes, see, e.g., Haar, Regionalism and Realism
in Land Use Planning,105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957), it is not an inherently
preferable forum for the airing of views and exchange of criticism and ideas
between the two units. The rule proposed in this Article, moreover, does not
require a decision maker at the administrative level; rather, it attempts to
force the governmental units to negotiate and will review cases of failed compromise by adopting the rules explained in text accompanying notes 164-216
infra.

158. 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977). The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently
overruled Suntide Inn and expressly adopted the balancing test. Independent
School Dist. No. 89 v. City of Oklahoma City, 722 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Okla. 1986).
159. Suntide Inn, 563 P.2d at 127.
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the center furthered an important state concern, 160 the court
deemed city zoning approval unnecessary and unwise. Concluding that the legislature could not have intended to allow city officials to prevent the state from opening its facility, the court
rejected the city's claim that the state should submit the proposal to the planning commission. By equating the submission of
the project to the local commission with a grant of local power
to exclude the use, the court adopted the unfortunate dichotomy between total immunity and total host control.
In contrast, a recent New Jersey appellate decision refused
to exempt a regional sewerage authority from seeking local site
plan approval of its proposed pumping station. 16 1 By noting
that the town's request was not to assert local control in a way
that would interfere with the purposes of the project or prohibit its construction, the court recognized the unique purposes
furthered by the local planning ordinance involved: "to preserve natural resources on a construction site, ensure safe and
efficient traffic flow, promote aesthetic considerations and
safety, conserve energy and ensure essential services to residents and occupants."' 62 As illustrated by this case, a rule requiring good faith intruder participation in local land use
procedures would maximize the incentive for intergovernmental cooperation and would recognize that host input, not host
control, is the goal of that requirement.

B.

CHOOSING BETWEEN HOST CONTROL AND
INTRUDER IMMUNITY

If a court adopts the rule proposed above, the litigated intergovernmental disputes will no longer involve assertions of
absolute intruder immunity or total host control. They will instead be limited to those instances in which attempts to com160. Id. at 128.
161. Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Auth., 194 N.J.
Super. 199, 204-05, 476 A.2d 816, 819 (App. Div. 1984).
162. Id. at 204, 476 A.2d at 819. See also Village of Camillus v. West Side
Gymnastics School, 109 Misc. 2d 609, 440 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981). In
Camillus the town unsuccessfully sought to compel the school district to apply
for a variance to legitimize the leasing of unoccupied school buildings for
noneducational purposes. The village wanted not to control the school district,
but to provide its input into the decision of which tenants would be appropriate for the neighborhood. Because the incentives for intergovernmental cooperation are at their highest when the two districts are coterminous, see infra
text accompanying notes 191-201, a holding requiring the school district to
seek a variance would not be likely to undercut or thwart the effectiveness of
that unit of government.
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promise have failed, either because of the bad faith or
arbitrariness of one party or because of the irreconcilable conflicts between two legitimate governmental concerns.
At that point, this Article proposes that a predetermined
allocation of the land use right is superior to a case by case application of a general balancing rule. Moreover, this Article
proposes that the right be given to the governmental unit that
is more likely to maximize the public welfare because it has a
greater institutional incentive to accommodate the other.
Although it may generally be true that the decision to grant
the right to one party over the other will not affect their negotiated agreement, the allocation suggested here reflects the belief that as the political relationship between the governmental
units changes, so does the likelihood that a particular host or
intruder will be flexible and responsive to the other's concerns
and needs. The rule proposed takes into account the relevant
political processes involved in the dispute as well as the political relationship between the two governmental units. Thus, it
removes the courts from the role of choosing between two legitimate public interests, while adding predictability of result for
the governmental units involved. The following section considers the four contexts in which these failed attempts at compromise may arise 63 and suggests a proper allocation of the land
use right for each.
1.

Intruder Embraces Host

The most frequent disputes involve a host unit that is embraced by the intruding unit.16 4 Within this category, the most
common disputes are between a city host and a state intruder,165 or a city host and a county intruder. 166 Two aspects
163. A fifth logical possibility, that of intersecting and only partially overlapping units, arises only very infrequently. See, e.g., Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Board of Educ., 315 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. App. 1958). In that case, a
fire district embracing fifteen municipalities sought to impose its regulations
on a school district that was only partially within its jurisdiction. Id- at 874.
This situation most closely reflects the realities of the intruder-host relationship that arises when the governmental units are not contiguous. See infra
text accompanying notes 208-16.
164. The term "embrace" is used to describe a governmental unit whose
constituency and territorial jurisdiction encompass the entirety of the constituency and jurisdiction of another discrete governmental unit.
165. For a few recent representative cases, see City of New Orleans v.
State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978); Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378
A.2d 1326 (1977); Dearden v. City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139
(1978); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H.
885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980); City of Portsmouth v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 117
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of this intruder-host relationship are particularly relevant to
the resolution attempt. The first aspect relates to the constituencies represented by the respective governmental units; the
second involves the effectiveness of the political process as an
incentive for accommodation. Taken together, these factors
persuasively support a rule of intruder immunity.
With regard to the constituencies represented by the governmental units in this type of dispute, it is clear that the intruder is furthering the health, safety, and welfare of a group
including but greater than the host's constituency. Thus, the
use proposed by the intruder will benefit a group that is more
broadly based than the host's constituency, but includes all
members of the host's constituency as well. The importance of
this difference in constituency lies not in the notion of which
governmental unit is superior, 167 but rather in the light it sheds
on the relative position of each unit vis &vis the other. Because
all constituents of the host are also constituents of the intruder,
the intruder has presumably considered the health, safety, and
welfare of the host in reaching its decision on the proposed project. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island took note of this fact
N.H. 797, 378 A.2d 1383 (1977); City of Santa Fe v. Armijo, 96 N.M. 663, 634
P.2d 685 (1981); In re Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977); Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 585 Pa. 614, 483
A.2d 448 (1984); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards
& Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1982); State v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162,
615 P.2d 461 (1980).
166. For recent examples of intergovernmental disputes in this context, see
County Comm'rs v. Conservation Comm'n, 380 Mass. 706, 405 N.E.2d 637
(1980); City of Vinita Park v. Girls Sheltercare, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); Mental Health Ass'n v. City of Elizabeth, 180 N.J. Super. 304, 434
A.2d 688 (Law Div. 1981); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694
(N.D. 1977); City of East Cleveland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 Ohio St.
2d 23, 430 N.E.2d 456 (1982); City of Gallatin v. Cherokee County, 615 S.W.2d
321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981). Other possible examples of the same type of hostintruder relationship include, but are not limited to: a city host and a regional
district intruder, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill.
2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971); a township host and county intruder, e.g., Town of
Ringle v. County of Marathon, 104 Wis. 2d 297, 311 N.W.2d 595 (1981); county
host and state intruder, e.g., Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292
S.W.2d 777 (1956); township host and state intruder, e.g., Township of S. Fayette v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 574, 385 A.2d 344 (1978); township host and a
county-wide special district intruder, e.g., Institution Dist. v. Township of Middletown, 450 Pa. 282, 299 A.2d 599 (1973).
167. The superior sovereign test uses the relative rankings in a governmental hierarchy as the dispositive factor in determining between host control and
intruder immunity. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45. As discussed
here, the relevant consideration is the comparison between the constituencies
served by the two units.
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in Blackstone Park Improvement Association v. State Board of
Standards and Appeals,168 when it decided that the state's proposed rehabilitative center for injured workers throughout the
state was "of vital importance not only to workers and their
families but also to the general public welfare and the state's
economy.' 6 9 Similarly, in Rutgers, The State University v. Piluso, 170 the New Jersey Supreme Court described the state university system as "an essential governmental function for the
benefit of all the people of the state.' 171 This characteristic of
the intruder-host relationship suggests that the intruder has an
incentive to act with the interests of the host in mind and
would be responsive to legitimate host concerns. 172
Although the intruder typically has a great incentive to accommodate its host, the host in this context may have little or
none of the same incentive for compromise. Frequently, the
group most directly served by the intruder's proposed project
will not be host constituents. It is likely that the intruder's
project is intended to benefit not only the intruder's constituents who live within the host unit, but also constituents from
any other location within the intruder's territorial jurisdiction.
Only a small segment of the host population will typically benefit from intruder projects such as residential or educational
centers for the handicapped, 173 community treatment or pre168. 448 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1982).
169. Id. at 1240.
170. 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972). See also Oswald v. Westchester
County Park Comm'n, 234 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ("rThe proper administrative authorities must have determined that there is sufficient public
demand to justify the creation of at least one such [recreation] area in the
large and populous county of Westchester."), aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 1139, 239
N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 1963).
171. Piluso, 60 N.J. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703.
172. To the extent that the intruder is likely to be operating similar facilities at other locations not within the host's jurisdiction, it may have a slightly
diminished incentive to negotiate with local authorities because it may argue
that uniformity at all locations is necessary to further legislative intent. See,
e.g., Dearden v. City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 266-67, 269 N.W.2d 139, 143
(1978); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H.
885, 888, 424 A.2d 207, 209 (1980). If a jurisdiction adopts the rule requiring
intruder participation in host proceedings, however, host input into the implementation of the project becomes relevant and would-require the intruder to
give reasons for any claim that implementation of the project required uniformity in physical plant. The cases cited above provide no explanation of the
assertion.
173. See, e.g., Canton Charter Township v. Department of Social Servs., 128
Mich. App. 505, 340 N.W.2d 306 (1983); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v.
Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980); Berger v. State, 71 N.J.
206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); Conners v. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Chil-
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release centers for convicts, 174 or residential centers for drug
addicts. 175 The host may therefore see little reason for the project to be located within its borders. The result is a decrease in
the host's incentive to accommodate the intruder.
Also related to the issue of constituency is the fact that the
governmental mission of the host is limited to the health,
safety, and welfare concerns of its own constituents. The host
has little if any incentive to seek independently to further the
welfare of individuals beyond its borders. It may therefore be
unrealistic to expect a host government to approve enthusiastically of the types of projects frequently proposed by the "embracing" intruder. 176 A more realistic evaluation would allow
the host to work with the intruder to make the implementation
of the project as palatable as possible for host constituents.
The incentive of the intruder to accommodate the host is
also maximized by the operation of certain political pressures
in these types of disputes. When the intruder participates in
the host's land use proceedings, the objectors at those hearings
will by definition be constituents of the intruder. The intruder,
then, has good reason to listen to any objections that may be
aired and attempt to accommodate them.'7 7 There will, howdren, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 861, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1975); City of E. Cleveland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 Ohio St. 23, 430 N.E.2d 456 (1982);
Commonwealth Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 585 Pa.
614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984).
174. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978); Dearden v. City of Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978); In re Suntide Inn
Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977); Township of South Fayette v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 574, 385 A.2d 344 (1978); City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth,
468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976).
175. E.g., Long Branch Div. of United Civic & Taxpayers Org. v. Cowan,
119 N.J. Super. 306, 291 A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1972).
176. In Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306
N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973), the New York Court of Appeals upheld a
zoning ordinance passed by the Village of Mount Kisco against a neighboring
municipality's challenge. In dissent, Judge Breitel criticized the majority for
having considered the rationality of the disputed zoning ordinance solely from
the perspective of Mount Kisco's own land use plan, while ignoring the tremendous impact the ordinance would have on its neighbor. Judge Breitel emphasized the neighbor's extremely limited input into Mount Kisco's legislative
process and advocated regional action to avoid "the pitfall of idiosyncratic municipal action." Id. at 192, 306 N.E.2d at 162, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 139. For perhaps
the best known, yet less than totally successful, attempt to force local governments to legislate for the benefit of a larger constituency, see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d
390 (1983).
177. Of course, just because the intruder finally proceeds with a plan that
elicited vigorous opposition from host objectors does not mean that it ignored
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ever, be little political pressure on host decision makers to accommodate the intruders. None of the host's decision makers
represent the intruder, except to the extent that they are also
members of the intruder's constituency. Moreover, because it is
likely that the intruder's project will benefit only a small segment of the host's constituency, its supporters, even if they are
host constituents, are unlikely to exert much political pressure
on the host.
The political accountability factor thus also suggests that
the intruder is more likely than the host to make compromises
that reflect the other governmental unit's interests. Moreover,
unlike some other contexts discussed below, this particular
host-intruder relationship does not reflect an attempt by the intruder to avoid the political fallout of developing a potentially
undesirable project by pushing the project off onto a constituency other than its own.L71 When the intruder embraces the
host, the proposed project is necessarily located not only within
the host's borders, but within the intruder's borders as well. In
sum, these considerations support a rule that would grant intruder immunity when the host unit is embraced by the intruding unit. As proposed above, the intruder should be required to
179
If
participate in good faith in the host's local proceedings.
these proceedings fail to result in host approval, however, the
intruder should nevertheless be allowed to proceed with the
project, leaving the burden on the host to challenge the intruder's actions as arbitrary.
2.

Host Embraces Intruder

The second most frequent context for intergovernmental
land use disputes involves an intruding unit that is embraced by
its host. The intruding unit in this context forms part of the
territorial and political jurisdiction of the host but is itself a
separate governmental unit. Typical of this second type of
host-intruder relationship are those cases in which a city seeks
that opposition, failed to accommodate it as best it could, or otherwise acted
arbitrarily. See Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 220, 364 A.2d 993, 1000 (1976).
178. In Johnston, supra note 14, the author argues that immunity allows
the intruder to "easily side-step volatile political issues by locating necessary
but unpleasant services in adjacent jurisdictions." Id. at 331. Although this incentive may be present in some situations, such as when the host and intruder
are noncontiguous units or when the host embraces the intruder, see infra
text accompanying notes 187-89 & 213-16, it is certainly not a motivating factor
when the intruding governmental unit encompasses the host and is by definition locating the use within its own borders.
179. See supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text.
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to use land outside its municipal limits but within the territory

of its county.18 0 In recent years, as increasing county land use
regulation l8 1 has paralleled the growing public awareness of
the environmental hazards associated with certain land uses,
cases of this type have frequently involved a city's attempt to
locate a waste disposal facility at a county site over county
82
objection.1
An analysis of this particular host-intruder relationship
will reveal the differences between this type of dispute and the
previously discussed dispute that involves an intruder that embraces the host. 8 3 In this second context, it is the intruder that
has the lesser incentive to accommodate legitimate host concerns. The more appropriate result in this case, therefore, is to
grant the land use right to the host. Unless the intruder can establish that the host's actions were arbitrary, host denial of necessary permits should prevent the intruder from proceeding
with its project.
Several aspects of this type of host-intruder relationship
operate both to minimize the intruder's incentive to compromise and at the same time to encourage the host to act in an
accommodating manner. First, because all of the intruder's
constituents are also constituents of the host, the host has the
responsibility to act in furtherance of the health, safety, and
welfare of the intruder's inhabitants. The host's accountability
to the intruder's constituents also is ensured by the fact that
the host's governing bodies include members of the intruder's
180. For a few recent representative cases, see Seward County Bd. of
Cormn'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976); City of Fargo
v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977); Board of County Supervisors v. City of Roanoke, 220 Va. 195, 257 S.E.2d 781 (1979); Nelson v. Department of Natural Resources, 96 Wis. 2d 730, 292 N.W.2d 655 (1980). Other less
frequently occurring examples of situations involving a host that embraces its
intruder could include township host and city intruder, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 480, 14 N.W.2d 140 (1944); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township,
256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977), county host and township intruder, or county host
and special district intruder.
181. 8 E. McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.04, at 11
(3d ed. 1983). For an interesting case involving extensive county land use regulation, see City of Coconut Creek v. Broward County Bd. of County Corm'rs,
430 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
182. E.g., O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972);
Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972);
St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962); State ex rel.
Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960); South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce
County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 591 P.2d 877 (1979).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 165-79.
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constituency.1 8 4 When coupled with the fact that the host has
the responsibility to act in furtherance of the health, safety,
and welfare of the intruder's constituency, this direct political
representation on the host's governing bodies greatly enhances
the likelihood that the host will strive to accommodate the intruder's proposal.
Conversely, the intruding governmental unit has several
disincentives for negotiation. In terms of its political function
as well as in terms of direct political accountability, the intruder is less likely than the host to be accommodating. As a
constituent element of the host, the intruder's governing bodies
do not represent the same broader constituency as the host government. The intruder is therefore more likely to focus on its
narrower self interest and to be less responsive to the objections raised by the broader-based host. In addition, because the
objectors to the project will not be constituents of the intruder,
the efficacy of political pressure is greatly reduced. In this context, then, the host has greater incentive to accommodate and
negotiate than the intruder. The burden of failed compromise
should therefore be placed on the intruder in this situation.
Other features of this particular host-intruder relationship
argue in favor of allocating the land use right to the host when
the intruder has failed to obtain local approval. First, the intruder's proposed use may or may not benefit anyone other
than its own constituents. For example, a city sewage treatment plant located in the county may service only the needs of
city inhabitants.18 5 In such a case, the host's incentive to accommodate the intruder stems solely from its position as a government whose jurisdiction encompasses the intruder's
constituents. A city airport, in contrast, will provide direct and
indirect benefits to county inhabitants outside the city.1 86 In
184. See C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERm ENT LAW: CoUNTY LAw § 32.07
(1966). For an example of a situation in which the host's governing body will
include members of the intruder's constituency, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34,
para. 832, 833 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
185. E.g., O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972);
St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962). This compartmentalized and somewhat myopic view of local government's functions
has recently been giving way to increased efforts at intergovernmental agreements to establish one site for the use of several units of government. See, e.g.,
City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill. 2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428
(1971); Shupack v. Manasquan River Regional Sewerage Auth., 194 N.J. Super.
199, 476 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1984). See generally R. BisH & V. OSTROM, supra
note 30, for an excellent discussion of how the level of governmental service
units should be determined.
186. See, e.g., Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist.
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this case, the host's incentive to participate willingly in the implementation of the intruder's proposal is further increased because host constituents who are not residents of the intruding
unit will also benefit from the project.
Another factor that weighs in favor of host control in these
types of disputes relates to the possibility that the intruder's
choice of an extraterritorial site may reflect an attempt to push
an undesirable form of land use outside of its borders and thus
avoid heated objection from its own constituents.18 7 As one
court noted, "one city is less likely to be scrupulous about the
location of its potentially offensive governmental activities in
another city than 'at home' within its own boundaries."' 8 8 For
this reason, host control would increase the likelihood that the
intruder's proposed site was the result of rational decision mak89
ing instead of political shrewdness.
3.

Intruder Coterminous with Host

In the third possible context for intergovernmental disputes, the two governmental units are coterminous. This situation describes the relationship between a large number of
special districts 90 and the governments they serve.' 91 Most of
Ct. App. 1974); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266,
242 N.W.2d 849 (1976). In both of these cases, the intruder had not even attempted to comply with the host county's zoning ordinance. These cases arose,
then, not solely because of the failure of the political process but also because
the courts of that jurisdiction did not require the intruding city to request approval and input from the host in formal host zoning proceedings. See discussion at text accompanying notes 147-62 supra.
187. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 331-32.
188. Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974). In reality, most attempts to locate unpopular land use projects are
a result of the unavailability of land within the intruder's jurisdiction. Airports and landfills are examples of uses for which a populated city may simply
have no remaining available land. See supra notes 182 & 186.
189. One final consideration is a purely practical one. For the host that
may have numerous potential intruders within its own territorial limits, a rule
that would require it to bear the burden of challenging the intruder's immunity after failed attempts to compromise at the local level could be extremely
onerous. For example, St. Louis County in Missouri has approximately 100 incorporated cities within its borders. St. Louis County v. City of Manchester,
360 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo. 1962). By placing the burden on the frustrated intruder, however, the courts will preserve the integrity of the host's zoning
plan unless the host's refusal to accommodate the intruder was arbitrary.
190. Many special districts, however, encompass more than one municipality. See, e.g., City of Orlando v. School Bd., 362 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 M. 2d 11, 268
N.E.2d 428 (1971); Township Comm. v. Board of Educ., 59 N.J. 143, 279 A.2d
842 (1971); City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Auth., 16 Ohio
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the reported cases in this area involve disputes between a
school district and its host municipality;192 the total number of
cases between coterminous units of local government is, however, small.
The relative paucity of litigation between coterminous
units of local government is not surprising. Indeed, it is in this
context that the incentive to negotiate is at its maximum and is
equal for each unit. Both groups must act in furtherance of the
health, safety, and welfare of the same constituents; thus, all legitimate action taken by the intruding special district will by
definition provide a benefit to the health, safety, and welfare of
the host's constituency. 193 The affected citizens and objectors
Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (C.P. Ct. 1967); Austin Indep. School Dist. v. City of
Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973). Thus, they fit into the classification
of a host that embraces its intruder. See supra text accompanying notes 18089.
191. In 1982, the United States census tabulated 28,588 special districts in
addition to 14,851 school districts. In contrast, there were 19,076 municipalities, 3,041 counties, and 16,734 townships. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNiMENTs 3 (1983). For a brief introduction to special districts, see
1 E. McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 2.28, 2.29 (3d ed.
rev. 1971).
192. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 117, 302 P.2d 574 (1956); Cedar
Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 106
N.W.2d 655 (1960); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 468 So.
2d 709 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Cody Park Ass'n v. Royal Oak School Dist., 116
Mich. App. 103, 321 N.W.2d 855 (1982); Smith v. Board of Educ., 359 Mo. 264,
221 S.W.2d 203 (1949); Board of Educ. v. City of St. Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 184 S.W.
975 (1916); Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 98, 302 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1969); Village of Camillus v. West Side Gymnastics School, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d
609, 440 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981); School Dist. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965); Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52 Utah 540,
175 P. 654 (1918). A survey of the case law reveals only a few instances of litigation between other types of special districts and their host governments.
See, e.g., Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of Wilmette, 112 Ill. 2d 6, 490 N.E.2d
1282 (1986) (park district); Clement v. Chicago Park Dist., 96 ll. 2d 26, 449
N.E.2d 81 (1983) (park district); Parking Auth. v. City of Trenton, 40 N.J. 251,
191 A.2d 289 (1963) (parking authority); Hill v. Borough of Collingswood, 9
N.J. 369, 88 A.2d 506 (1952) (park district); Barnathan v. Kramer, 44 Misc. 2d
203, 253 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (park water district). Although an authority is different from a special district, the two types of governmental units
have similar political relationships with the hosts they serve. See 1 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 191, § 2.29a.
193. Compare this situation with the case of a regional district seeking to
locate a large sports center for all its students. Residents of the chosen locale
may believe they are being unfairly burdened by a use that will benefit many
nonresidents. In City of Sunset Valley v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 488
S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 502 S.W.2d 670 (1973), for example, a large
school district that contained 18 junior and senior high schools proposed to
build a football stadium to seat 15,000 persons, a large field house, an athletic
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will be constituents of both units and will probably exert a sim194
ilar amount of political pressure on each governmental unit.
Moreover, because the two units serve an identical constituency, they will be in continuous contact with each other. The
frequent interaction between the two governments will insure
that they exercise their discretion reasonably and in a way that
195
will maximize the benefit to their common constituency.
The likelihood of achieving amicable resolutions in these
cases is high. Few of the adjudicated disputes between coterminous governmental units reveal situations in which the district
has unsuccessfully sought host approval and subsequently challenged the host's denial. 196 The cases more frequently involve
preemptory suits brought to challenge 197 or to assert' 98 the apfield and a school bus facility. The location chosen was a site in a small town
of 250 individuals.
194. That is, the objectors will represent the same percentage of the host's
constituency as of the intruder's. Compare this situation with the case of regional districts, where objectors from a particular municipality will be a much
smaller fraction of the district's total constituency than they will be of the host
municipality. Thus, concerned citizens are more likely to impose effective
political pressure for compromise in the former situation than in the latter.
195. See Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 468 So. 2d 709,
712 (La. Ct. App. 1985). In a recent opinion stressing the need for lower courts
to seek "intergovernmental cooperation," the Illinois Supreme Court pointed
to the 75 years of extensive cooperation between a park district and its host
municipality and expressed confidence that the parties would resolve their differences "on a cooperative basis, all to the benefit of the community which
both government units serve." Wilmette Park Dist. v. Village of Wilmette, 112
Ill. 2d 6, -, 490 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (1986). In this case, the court ruled that the
park district must apply to the local zoning board for a special use permit. The
district proposed to install newer, more intensive lights on a field and had refused to seek local approval. Id at -, 490 N.E.2d at 1284-85. Thus, the Illinois
court seems to have adopted the rule proposed above that would require intruder participation in host proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes
147-62.
196. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 278, 207
A.2d 864, 865 (1965) (school district challenged city's denial of zoning variance
for proposed school). In Board of Educ. v. City of St. Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 358-59,
184 S.W. 975, 975 (1916), it appears that the city would not have granted approval even if the school district had sought the necessary permits.
197. For cases in which the district filed suit to challenge the host's assertion that the district would have to obtain local approval before proceeding
with its project, see, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 106 N.W.2d 655 (1960); Orleans Parish School Bd.
v. City of New Orleans, 468 So. 2d 709 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Board of Educ. v.
City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 98, 302 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969); Independent School Dist.
No. 89 v. City of Oklahoma City, 722 P.2d 1212 (Okla. 1986).
198. For cases in which the municipality filed suit to challenge the intruder's assertion of immunity from local control, see, e.g., Cody Park Ass'n v.
Royal Oak School Dist., 116 Mich. App. 103, 321 N.W.2d 855 (1982); Smith v.
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plicability of local law. The requirement of intruder participation in local proceedings would eliminate these types of
disputes and would limit judicial involvement to situations in
which the available local forum has not produced a result satisfactory to both units.
In those instances in which the special district has unsuccessfully sought the approval of its coterminous host, courts
should grant the intruder immunity and thus place the burden
to challenge the intruder's actions as arbitrary on the host government. Although the governmental units in this relationship
have equal incentives for compromise, 199 several additional factors argue for a rule that would allocate the land use right to
the intruder. First, because the sole function of the intruder in
such cases is to provide the service that is the subject of the dispute, the host government will probably have little or no experience with the type of project in question.200 This lack of
expertise may make the host less likely to believe that a compromise is warranted for a particular project. Second, because
this type of intruder project benefits solely the host's constituents, the possibility that an intruding governmental unit will
benefit a constituency other than the host's at the host's expense is essentially eliminated. 20 1 Nor does the intruding special district have a desire to push off undesirable projects,
because the use is being proposed within the intruder's own territorial limits. Taken together, these facts provide a rational
basis for allocating the land use right to the intruder in this
context.
Board of Educ., 359 Mo. 264, 221 S.W.2d 203 (1949); Village of Camillus v. West
Side Gymnastics School, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 609, 440 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct.
1981); Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654 (1918).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 190-95. In this regard, the coterminous host-intruder relationship is unlike both the case in which the intruder
embraces the host and has greater incentive to negotiate, see supra text accompanying notes 165-79, and in which the host embraces the intruder and has
greater incentive to negotiate, see supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
200. In this regard, the host will be in much the same position as the host
that is embraced by the intruder. In that context, the intruder's proposed
projects are frequently specialized and are needed by a small segment of a constituency larger than, but including, the host. See supra text accompanying
notes 167-75.
201. Thus, it is quite unlike the situation in City of Sunset Valley v. Austin
Indep. School Dist, in which a regional school district proposed to build a football stadium to seat 15,000 persons in a small town with a population of 250.
488 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 502 S.W.2d 670 (1973).
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Noncontiguous Governmental Units

The fourth type of intergovernmental land use dispute occurs when the intruder and host are noncontiguous governmental units. This type of litigation typically involves one
municipality seeking to use land within the borders of another
municipality 20 2 or within the jurisdiction of a county other than
its own. 20 3 Although state statutes may theoretically give local
governments an unlimited ability to exercise land use rights
outside their borders, 204 practical considerations usually will
limit the intruder's exercise of such power to land relatively
close to the intruder's territorial limits. A local government
seeking to acquire a site for a municipal swimming pool, 205 for
example, will not provide much benefit to its constituents if the
land is too far from their homes. Similarly, cost considerations
will frequently make distant sites much less attractive than
those closer to home. 20 6 Perhaps as a result of these practical
limits on the scope of extraterritorial power, the reported cases
involving a noncontiguous intruder-host relationship are few.
In contrast to the coterminous intergovernmental disputes
discussed above,207 in which the incentive to negotiate is at its
maximum for both parties, conflicts between noncontiguous
governmental units create few of the institutional political
pressures that operate to further compromise and accord.208 In
fact, both the host and the intruding governmental units have
several reasons not to cooperate. Unlike the parties in the cate202. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d
637 (1962); City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979); Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d
761 (1965).
203. See, e.g., State ex reL City of Gower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453 (S.D. 1977). When a
municipality uses land within its own county, the intruder-host relationship
falls into the category of host embraces intruder, which involves a very different set of extrajudicial incentives for compromise. See supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
204. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-139-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986).
205. See City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
206. For example, transportation costs associated with a landfill operation
will make distance a relevant factor.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 190-201.
208. Of course, several important extrajudicial incentives for nonadjudicated conflict resolution are present in all intergovernmental land use disputes. See supratext accompanying notes 135-36. The incentives deriving from
the political relationship itself, however, are absent in the case of noncontinguous host-intruder relationships.
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gories discussed above, in which the disincentives of one governmental unit were offset by countervailing incentives to
negotiate on the part of the other unit, neither party in a land
use dispute between noncontiguous governmental units is subjected to political pressures to accommodate the other.
From the host's perspective, and in terms of its incentive to
accommodate the intruding governmental unit, the situation is
much like the cases involving an intruder that embraces the
host.20 9 The host's constituents will derive no benefit from the
proposed use and the host's governing bodies have no political
obligation to act in furtherance of the health, safety, and welfare of the intruder's constituency. The host may therefore be
unsympathetic to the intruder's need for the project. Similarly,
the intruder's political relationship with its host is unlikely to
exert any effective political pressure on the host to cooperate
and compromise. In this regard, the intruder's position is very
similar to the position of the intruder in cases in which the host
embraces the intruder.210 The intruder has no political responsibility toward host constituents; rather, it seeks only to benefit
its own distinct constituency. Moreover, objectors to the intruder's proposals will not be constituents of the intruder, thus
reducing the effectiveness of the political check as an incentive
for responsible intruder behavior.
Unlike the intruder-host relationships discussed above, in
which allocation of the land use right reflected the parties' respective incentives to negotiate, in this situation the extrajudicial incentives are at their lowest. The choice between
immunity and host control in this context, then, must depend
on a different set of considerations. Several factors point in
favor of granting host control over the intruder's project when
intruder participation in local proceedings has not resulted in
host approval.
First, to some extent, the allocation of the land use right
may have an effect on the intruder's initial choice of site. That
is, if the intruder knows that, in the case of failed negotiations,
it will have to establish the arbitrariness of its host if it remains
within its own county but not if it goes to another county, that
factor may be a relevant consideration in the intruder's decision
making process. As discussed above, granting the host control
when the intruder exercises extraterritorial power within a
governmental unit that embraces it maximizes the incentive of
209. See supra text accompanying notes 165-79.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
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both parties to compromise.2 1 ' Granting the right to the intruder when the two units are non-contiguous may therefore
increase the intruder's incentive to select a site within the borders of the noncontiguous host unit. The intruder would thus
be provided with an irrelevant incentive to select one site over
the other. Granting host control over the noncontiguous intruder, however, would maximize the likelihood that the use
will be located at the most appropriate site.
Second, allocation of the right to one governmental unit involves a concomitant allocation of the burden to the other unit
to challenge the arbitrariness of the right's exercise. Placing
that burden on the host in this context would typically require
the host to obtain information to which it has no easy access.
Evidence relating to the availability of alternative sites21 2 or to
the decision making process used by an intruding governmental
unit may be difficult if not impossible for the host to obtain.
The intruder, in contrast, will have become familiar with the
host's entire decision making process and will thus have all
available evidence relating to the arbitrariness of that proceeding and its result.
Finally, because the noncontiguous intruder proposes to develop a project in a jurisdiction to which it owes no political allegiance and because the undesirable effects of such a project
will not affect the noncontiguous intruder, it is not unfair to
limit the exercise of that power to those instances in which
host approval is given or, alternatively, in which the intruder
can establish that host approval was arbitrarily denied. This
situation presents the greatest potential for an intruder to
abuse the land use right by 'pushing off' an unpopular project
on a noncontiguous host.213 Because such projects are often unpopular and involve environmental hazards, 2 14 the intruder
may be tempted to select a site that is located within the jurisdiction of a government with which it has no direct political relationship. For example, the city that seeks to locate a landfill
site in a portion of its own county will face more effective polit211.
212.

See supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
See Comment, BalancingInterests, supra note 14, at 135 n.72.

213. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 331-32.
214. The majority of cases involves disputes over waste disposal facilities.
See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637
(1962); State ex rel. City of Gower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);

City of Rochester v. Town of Rush, 67 Misc. 2d 328, 324 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup. Ct.
1971); Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453 (S.D. 1977); City of Plano v.
City of Allen, 395 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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ical pressure than a city that selects a site that is located in another county. In the former situation, the continuous contact
and ongoing close political relationship 215 between the two
units will facilitate accommodation and compromise. When the
city goes outside its own county, however, the incentives for
compromise disappear. Granting the host control when the
noncontiguous intruder has failed to obtain the necessary apintruder will act
proval should diminish the likelihood that the
21 6
concerns
legitimate
host's
the
of
disregard
in
C.

JuDicIAL REVIEW

The approach suggested above is based on several assumptions. First, requiring an intruder to participate in good faith in
host proceedings will minimize intergovernmental conflict by
providing the parties with a local forum in which to air differences and to achieve compromise. 217 Second, in cases of failed
negotiations a rule allocating the right of host control or intruder immunity is preferable to balancing because it encourages negotiation over litigation by establishing predictability of
result.2 18 Third, judicial allocation of the land use right should
219
reflect the extrajudicial political incentives for compromise.
Although this approach minimizes litigation and encourages
nonadjudicated solutions to intergovernmental disputes, judicial
review is still necessary to provide a check against arbitrary exercises of host control and intruder immunity.
Over the years, the need for judicial review of intergovern215. For example, many of the county's decision makers will be residents
of the city. See supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
216. In contrast, the arguments in favor of placing the burden on the host
are less compelling. First, one could claim that because the uses are frequently unpopular but nevertheless a "stark necessity," City of Scottsdale v.
Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 398, 368 P.2d 637, 640 (1962), the court should
presume the legitimacy of the intruder's proposal and force the host to show
that the intruder's decisions were arbitrary. This Article, however, has already discussed the intruder's countervailing incentive to locate unpopular
uses beyond its borders. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15. Second,
because state agencies are often involved in the site selection of many of these
uses, see, e.g., Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 454 (S.D. 1977), one
could argue that the additional check of placing the burden on the intruder is
unnecessary. Even if state involvement in site selection is extensive, however,
the state agency may have neither the mandate nor the familiarity with local
conditions to consider the host's particular concerns. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 147-62.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 125-46.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 165-216.
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mental disputes has varied depending on the immunity test applied; the courts, however, have always recognized the judicial
function of providing relief from arbitrary governmental decision making. Courts that apply the traditional tests of intruder
immunity, with their limited scope of judicial review, have frequently extended protection against the arbitrary exercise of
intruder immunity 220 or host control. 22 ' For courts adopting a
balancing test, however, judicial involvement has been much
greater. Judicial review is available not only to make the initial
choice between intruder immunity and host control but also to
ensure subsequently that the intruder immunity 222 or host contro1223 is not exercised in an arbitrary fashion. Unfortunately,
the courts have provided little guidance on how to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to intergovernmental disputes.
What constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct in the
context of land use litigation is, however, well established and
fairly uniform. A leading commentator has provided a useful
definition: "fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or
by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference
to principles, circumstances, or significance, or given to making
decisions thus; decisive but unreasoned. '' 224 Another commentator has stated that the most telling characteristic of arbitrary
governmental action with regard to land use is a government's
failure to give legitimate reasons for its decision.225 Thus,
courts will invalidate governmental land use decisions that appear to have no basis in applicable law225 or that do not reflect
220. E.g., Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 191, 84 S.E.2d 454, 455
(1954); Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Mo. 1970); Town
of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 18 N.J. 237, 240, 113 A.2d 658, 659
(1955); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 62, 79
N.E.2d 698, 705 (C.P. Ct. 1947), affl', 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948).
221. E.g., Porter v. Southwestern Public Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361, 364
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972); City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679,
685-87, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1958).
222. E.g., Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153-54, 286 A.2d 697,
703 (1972); Blackstone Park Improvement Ass'n v. State Bd. of Standards &
Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1238-40 (R.I. 1982).
223. E.g., Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple
Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 613 n.5 (Fla. 1976); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish &

Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 113-14, 576 P.2d 230, 238-39 (1978); City of
Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 697-98 (N.D. 1977).
224. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 16.11, at 33-34 (2d ed.
1977).
225. 7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 52.05[3] (1986).
226. See, e.g., Young's Court, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 4 Mass. App.
Ct. 130, 132-34, 343 N.E.2d 424, 426-27 (1976); Valicenti v. Township of Upper
St. Clair, 408 Pa. 416, 420, 184 A.2d 263, 266 (1962).
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rational decision making.2 27 Properly applied, the arbitrary and
capricious standard allows only a limited review of the procedures followed in the decision making process. It does not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
22 8
governmental unit.
Although the meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard is directly transferable from the land use cases to cases involving intergovernmental disputes, the context in which it is
applied introduces a new twist. Under this standard, the courts
cannot limit their review to a determination whether, solely
from the perspective of the governmental unit exercising the
land use right, the power was arbitrarily exercised. Rather, the
courts must recognize that the legitimacy of governmental
power in this context depends, not solely on its adherence to its
own legislative mandate, but also on its recognition and accommodation of the legislative mandate conferring power on the
opposing governmental unit.
1.

Arbitrary and Capricious Host Control

Courts applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to review a challenge to host control must recognize that the intruder is a governmental unit exercising properly delegated
legislative powers of the state and furthering an explicit state
policy. 229 Thus, the court must also consider whether the host's
227.

See, e.g., Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578,

584-86, 141 A.2d 308, 311-12 (1958).
228. In the context of administrative rulemaking procedures the Supreme
Court recently provided this helpful description of arbitrary and capricious activity: "Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
229. In some instances, the courts will have to consider whether the intruder is even a proper party to claim governmental immunity. Although one
commentator has suggested application of ordinary principles of agency law,
Johnston, supra note 14, at 330 n.19, that standard is insufficient. In a Florida
case, for example, a nonprofit association contracted with the state to provide
residential care for the mentally retarded. The association unsuccessfully
sought immunity from local zoning. The appellate court noted that the state
was not even aware of the litigation until after the appellate court's opinion
was issued. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 So. 2d 571, 579-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (on petition for rehearing), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976). Because nongovernmental users of
land are not subject to the political check, and because of the numerous groups
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actions were arbitrary when measured against the backdrop of
the intruder's legislative mandate. 230 In such a case, application
of host control to prohibit an intruder's proposed use merely
because the host disliked the use or found it offensive would directly contravene a legislative determination that the proposed
231
use was in furtherance of the public interest.
In City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara Unified School District, 232 for example, the host government refused to give its

approval to a school district's choice of location for a continuation high school. The school district had requested a special use
permit from the city and had agreed to comply with the planning commission's imposition of certain conditions related to
landscaping, construction, and parking. The school district subsequently met with the city's architectural control committee
and agreed to additional modifications of its plan. The city
council denied the district's application, and the district sued.
In its opinion the court noted that the school district's choice
and agencies receiving governmental funding, the court should grant immunity only to those users that show sufficient essential indicia of a governmental unit. On that basis, for example, a nonprofit corporation that contracts
with the state to carry out a state project will ordinarily not qualify for governmental immunity. Relevant factors would include: who had control over
personnel; sources of funding; and whether the user had been granted any governmental powers, such as eminent domain. For a discussion and application
of the test, see Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Mental
Health Center, 156 N.J. Super. 388, 406-09, 383 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Law Div. 1978).
See also Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 1920 (Me. 1981) (nonprofit corporations serving the state interest will not be
granted immunity from local zoning regulations unless substantial and continuing state involvement is established). But see Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Conm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 490-91,
314 S.E.2d 218, 224 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (asserting that a private, state
funded association should receive the immunity to which the state would be
entitled if it were operating the group home), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802
(1984).
230. See Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 189, 306
N.E.2d 155, 160, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137 (1973) (Breitel, J., dissenting). Judge
Breitel's dissent illustrates the dangers of "idiosyncratic municipal action" that
will go unchecked if the courts limit their review to a consideration of
whether a government's legislative actions were arbitrary solely from the
point of view of that government's own land use plan. Id. at 189-92, 306 N.E.2d
at 160-62, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 137-39.
231. Thus, the reviewing court cannot limit its review to a determination
whether the host government's enforcement of its regulation was arbitrary in
terms of its own zoning scheme. Were the inquiry so limited, enforcement of
the host's zoning ordinance to exclude landfills from its borders, for example,
would not necessarily constitute arbitrary action. See, e.g., County of Cook v.
John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 508-09, 389 N.E.2d 553, 557 (1979).
232. 22 Cal. App. 3d 152, 99 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972).
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was "reasoned and considered ' 2 33 and that the district had engaged in a careful site selection process. The court's consideration of the dispute was not limited to a determination of
whether the council's action was arbitrary within the context of
its own land use plan. The court recognized that the arbitrariness of the city council's action in this case stemmed not from
the application of its own zoning plan to the proposed use, but
rather from its failure to recognize that the legislature had delegated the power to develop such projects to the school district.234 In sum, judicial review of an intruder's claim of
arbitrary host action must also recognize that the legislature,
by granting the intruder the power to act within the host's territorial jurisdiction, has implicitly imposed on the host a duty to
apply its own laws in a way that will further the welfare of the
intruder's constituents as well as its own.
2.

Arbitrary and Capricious Intruder Immunity

Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to a
host's challenge to intruder immunity will also require the
court to broaden the context within which arbitrary conduct is
to be judged. Courts cannot limit their review to an evaluation
of the intruder's decision making process in isolation. The judicial analysis must also evaluate the intruder's exercise of power
within the context of the host's regulatory scheme, which was
similarly enacted pursuant to a valid delegation of power from
the state.
If, for example, a host can establish that the intruder refused to consider the host's zoning scheme or made no effort to
reevaluate its plan after hearing local objection, the intruder's
actions should be invalidated as arbitrary.2 35 On that basis, for
example, a reviewing court would strike as arbitrary an im233.

Id. at 159, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 218. The California appellate court also

noted that the evidence revealed that the council's opposition "was based on
[nothing] other than a blanket disapproval of the concept of a continuation
high school." Id at 160, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
234. For a similar approach to an intergovernmental land use dispute, see
Board of Zoning Appeals v. School City of Mishawaka, 127 Ind.App. 683, 69093, 145 N.E.2d 302, 305-07 (1957). In Mishawaka, the court reversed the city's
denial of a variance requested by the school district to enable it to build an
addition to its high school. Id. at 690-94, 145 N.E.2d at 305-07. The court concluded that the city's action did not adequately respond to the school district's
statutory duty "to establish schools and provide suitable equipment for their
operation." Id at 690, 145 N.E.2d at 305.
235. See Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 58486, 141 A.2d 308, 311-12 (1958).
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mune intruder's decision to provide only a few parking spaces
for a project when the relevant parking ordinance would require approximately five times as many places, and when the
intruder did not respond to the objections expressed by numerous concerned citizens.236 This action is arbitrary because it reflects solely the intruder's own interest in expansion and
disregards the host's regulatory scheme and the host's legitimate concerns about the negative impact of the use. Thus, judicial review will protect the host not only from irresponsible
intruder decisions, but also from unilateral exercises of
immunity.
3.

Judicial Review: A Comparison with Balancing

Consider the following scenario: a state agency responsible
for prisons proposes to build a new facility at a particular location. Application of the community's fire code would require a
sprinkler head in each inmate's cell. The state argues that the
cost of installation would be enormous and that having the
sprinklers would actually pose a danger. The state notes that
sprinklers can be vandalized or set off to distract guards and
that, by providing an attachment for a noose, they will facilitate
prisoner suicide. The city counters that the city has the duty of
providing fire protection, not only for the prison population and
its staff, but for the entire community as well. The only way to
live up to that duty and to prevent unnecessary deaths in fires,
237
it argues, is to apply its standards.
In a jurisdiction applying the balancing test, the state may
or may not choose to present its case to the relevant local authorities in a formal host proceeding. Assuming it does not,
and that it asserts intruder immunity from host regulation, a
236. In Robinson v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 467 So. 2d
911 (Miss. 1985), the school district planned to include 93 parking spaces in its
proposed construction of a large gymnasium. Applicable parking regulations
would have required between 375 and 500 spaces. Although the district had
received the approval of the local planning commission, the local proceeding
had not adhered to public notice and hearing requirements. Id. at 916-17.
Thus, the school district had never considered local objections to its proposal.
See also School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277,
207 A.2d 864 (1965) (school district made no attempt to modify plans to observe local zoning ordinances). Cf Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142,
153-54, 286 A.2d 697, 703 (1972) (refusal to consider local interests can constitute arbitrary action).
237. This hypothetical situation is based in part on the facts of a recent
case, Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. Board of Standards & Appeals, Pa. Commw. -,

509 A.2d 970 (1986).

1987]

INTERGOVERNMENTAL LAND DISPUTES

667

balancing court reviewing a dispute over the applicability of the
city's fire code would weight the interests sought to be furthered by both sides. First, the court would have to decide
whether the intruding state agency should have sought local
approval. Its decision would depend on which of the two governmental purposes, both of which are undeniably valid and
persuasive, it found more compelling. No matter which result
the court concludes is appropriate, however, judicial involvement in the dispute is not necessarily at an end. The balancing
court may later be called on to determine whether the host
238
control or intruder immunity was properly exercised.
In a jurisdiction adopting the approach proposed in this Article, the state would first petition the host for approval. At
that stage, institutional political pressures may operate to produce a negotiated result. If they did not, the approach suggested here would grant intruder immunity for two main
reasons: first, the political relationship between the two units
has already operated to give the intruding state agency more incentive than the host city to seek accommodation and to respond to legitimate host concerns; second, a comparison of the
two units' governmental purposes suggests that the balance be
2 39
struck here to allocate the right to the intruder.
Application of the approach suggested here has several advantages over the balancing test. First, it requires the governmental units to seek compromise;24 0 the balancing test may
encourage inflexible assertions of intruder immunity or host
control. 24 ' Second, it puts the primary burden of harmonizing
the apparent conflict between two assertions of legitimate governmental power on the conflicting units themselves and in the
forum most appropriate for the airing of all legitimate concerns. And third, it removes from the judicial role the task of
238. In some instances balancing courts have concluded that host law was
applicable while reminding the parties that the court would prevent arbitrary
exercise of host control. See supra note 137. A rule requiring intruder participation in local proceedings, however, removes that first round of disputes from
the courts. See supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text.
239. In these facts the intruder embraces the host. See supra text accompanying notes 165-79.
240. Of course, private lawsuits can challenge the compromise between the
two governments as itself being arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Evans v.
Just Open Gov't, 242 Ga. 834, 251 S.E.2d 546 (1979); Clement v. Chicago Park
Dist., 96 Ill. 2d 26, 449 N.E.2d 81 (1983); Robinson v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 467 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 1985); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330
S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
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favoring one legitimate public purpose over the other. In its
place it establishes a rule for allocating the right of host control
or intruder immunity according to the political relationship between the units, in response to their respective extrajudicial incentives for compromise, 242 and in recognition of the
governmental purposes served by both units.
V.

CONCLUSION

Intergovernmental land use disputes are the inevitable result of expanding governmental powers, increased awareness of
environmental hazards and the need for government control to
ensure orderly development and use of land, and diminishing
available locations for unpopular but necessary governmental
uses. A balancing approach to intergovernmental disputes has
proved unsuccessful because it engenders uncertainty and unpredictability and improperly involves the court in choosing between valid governmental objectives.
A rule that allocates the land use right to one government,
however, recognizes the imperative of intergovernmental cooperation and compromise and reflects the belief that the governmental units themselves, rather than the courts, are capable of
mutually accommodating their conflicting interests in most situations. This approach allows the ultimate land use decision to
depend on the political relationship between the two competing
governmental units and on the respective extrajudicial incentives each governmental unit has for compromise and rational
decision making. In addition, the approach provides predictability of results, and relegates judicial involvement to a very
limited and well-defined task in those cases in which the conflicting governmental units are unable to resolve their differences in a nonadjudicative forum. Finally, an application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard that requires a court to determine arbitrariness by considering the legislative mandates of
both governmental units will best effectuate a resolution of two
conflicting legislative policies.

242. Because application of the rule will bring predictable and certain results, the legislature will more easily be able to determine whether corrective
action is necessary. In addition, this rule has the advantage of forcing the legislature to make the difficult policy choices involved in choosing one public interest over another.

